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INTRODUCTION
Insurance law and tort law are fraternal twins. Though
not identical, they reflect one another. They may even finish
one another’s sentences.
Regardless of the bells and whistles on an automobile,
there will be accidents. So long as automobiles have drivers
1341
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responsible for controlling the wheel, the insurance scheme
may look much as it does at present. When the bells and
whistles do not sound as they should, however, an increasing
amount of liability for injuries is likely to bypass drivers and
alight on the sellers and manufacturers of the vehicle.1
Apart from other social benefits, there is every reason to
assume that autonomous vehicles (AVs) will be safer than
current automobiles. Among other features, they will enjoy a
360-degree field of vision, they will have a faster reaction
time, and they will not fall asleep.2 Assuming they are safer,
in an efficient market the overall cost of insuring AVs should
decrease. To the extent the insurance burden is ultimately
shouldered by those other than the driver,3 it will be added to
the cost of the car. Although lower, the owner will still bear
the cost of the premium.4 The lower direct and indirect
insurance cost should, therefore, benefit consumers. It also
should be more efficient for the manufacturer to purchase one
policy covering 10,000 automobiles than for drivers to
purchase 10,000 policies, each covering only one automobile.
If we contemplate the futuristic world of the totally
autonomous vehicle—one in which the driver is simply a
passenger free to read, text,5 or even sleep—the dynamics of

* Robert W. Peterson is a Professor of Law at Santa Clara University and
Director for the School of Law’s Center for Insurance Law and Regulation. The
author is very grateful to law student and research assistant, Nicole Hess, for
her assistance with this Article.
1. See Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417 (1978); Soule v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 559 (1994).
2. See HANS-JOACHIM WUENSCHE ET AL., RESARCH FOR THE INSTITUTE FOR
AUTONOMOUS
SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY,
available
at
http://www.elrob.org/fileadmin/catalogue/9.pdf.
3. Although the car may “drive” itself, this Article will use “driver” as
shorthand for driver/owner/operator/passenger in charge.
4. Since auto insurance is mandatory in California, the premium is a cost
of owning a car. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 16020 (West 2007). Although products
liability insurance is not mandatory, manufacturers and suppliers will also pass
their insurance costs through to purchasers.
5. Nevada recently amended its vehicle code to permit texting while in a
self-driving vehicle. Senate Bill 104 amended Nevada Revised Statutes section
484B.165 to read:
For the purposes of this section [prohibiting texting and mobile phone
use while operating a motor vehicle], a person shall be deemed not to
be operating a motor vehicle if the motor vehicle is driven
autonomously through the use of artificial-intelligence software and
the autonomous operation of the motor vehicle is authorized by law.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165.
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insuring a car may change considerably.6 If a driver is merely
a passenger, and if the driver’s responsibility is to remain
fault-based, then what purpose would a typical automobile
liability policy serve?7 What relevance remains for auto
insurance? This Article will address this issue and propose
ways in which auto insurance might change to accommodate
the use of AVs. Part I briefly reviews the background of
insurance regulation nationally and in California. Part II
discusses general insurance and liability issues related to
AVs. Part III discusses some challenges that insurers and
regulators may face when setting rates for AVs, both
generally and under California’s more idiosyncratic
regulatory structure. Part IV discusses challenges faced by
California insurers who may want to reduce rates in a timely
way when technological improvements rapidly reduce risk.
I.

CURRENT INSURANCE REGULATION

In 1945 Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act.8
This Act largely ceded regulation of insurance to the states.9
With rare exception, regulation of insurance has remained in
The year following the enactment of the
the states.10
McCarran-Ferguson Act, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) surveyed existing state
laws and proposed its model rating bills.11 These included the

6. Popular culture has imagined autonomous cars for years, from Woody
Allen’s 1973 movie “Sleeper,” to Stephen King’s 1986 movie “Maximum
Overdrive,” where cars come to life and reign terror over a small town, to the
popular animated children’s movies Cars and Cars 2. SLEEPER (Universal
Artist 1973); MAXIMUM OVERDRIVE (De Laurentiis Entertainment Group 1986);
CARS (Walt Disney Pictures 2006); CARS 2 (Walt Disney Pictures 2011).
7. Celent, a research group, published a study suggesting the possible
demise of liability insurance. Donald Light, A Scenario: The End of Auto
Insurance, CELENT (May 8, 2012), http://www.celent.com/reports/scenario-endauto-insurance (includes an Abstract and projected time line).
Of course, there will still be a need for collision, comprehensive, medical
pay, and perhaps underinsured motorist—although recovery under
underinsured motorist coverage requires proof of liability on the part of the
underinsured motorist. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 2006).
8. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2011).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
10. ERISA and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act are
exceptions. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1987).
11. Michael J. Miller, Disparate Impact and Unfair Discriminatory
Insurance Rates, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y E-FORUM, Winter 2009, at 276,
279, http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/09wforum/miller.pdf.
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provisions, now virtually standard in all states, that rates not
be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.12 Rates
could be modified for individual risks only if based on
“variations in hazards or expense provision, or both.”13
California adopted the restriction on unfairly discriminatory
rates in the 1947 McBride-Grunsky Act, and the restriction
that rates may not be “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly
discriminatory” was carried forward into Proposition 103.14
Virtually all insurance regulators include an assurance
within their brief that insurance companies remain solvent
and pay their claims.
This is reflected by the word
“inadequate” in the phrase “excessive, inadequate or unfairly
discriminatory.”15 A second goal, consumer protection, will be
reflected in statutes and regulations directed at, for example,
claims and marketing practices. Depending on how market
oriented the state may be, consumer protection is also
reflected by the fact that states regulate rates with the
purpose to keep them as low as practical. States differ
greatly with respect to their approach to accomplishing this
latter goal.16
Focusing on automobile insurance, most states divide
into three broad categories of regulation: prior approval, fileand-use, and use-and-file. File-and-use or use-and-file states
rely primarily on competition to determine insurance rates.17
Insurers may simply file their rates with their Insurance
Commissioner and use them (sometimes after a fairly short
waiting period), or use them immediately as long as they file
the rates within a specified period of time.18 Although
commissioners in these states have broad oversight and can
disapprove a rate based on inadequacy, excessiveness, or
unfair discrimination, they tend primarily to rely on the
12. Id. at 280.
13. Id.
14. See MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1445 (Ct. App.
2010); CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West 2011).
15. Id. § 1861.05(a).
16. See Vanessa Wells, Ships Passing in the Night: How California’s
Statutory Framework Directs Traffic Through the Maze of Jurisdictional
Doctrines Concerning Insurance Rates, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 853 (2010).
17. J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, STATE
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE REGULATION: A NATIONAL QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND
IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S UNIQUELY EFFECTIVE REGULATORY SYSTEM
2–3 (2008), available at http://www.consumerfed.org.
18. Id.
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marketplace to regulate rates.19
There is a substantial amount of data about automobile
loss experiences on which insurers and regulators base their
rates. All automobile owners are familiar with the practice of
adjusting auto rates up or down based on various factors
relevant to risk. Common factors relevant to risk include
driving record, miles driven, years licensed, education,
marital status, gender, location, type of car, years of coverage
by the company, academics, number of cars and drivers, etc.20
When working within the context of a file-and-use or useand-file environment, AVs will present only modest
challenges to an insurer that wants to write these policies.
The main challenge will arise from the fact that the policy
must be rated for a new technology that may have an
inadequate base of experience for an actuary to estimate
future losses.21
“Prior approval” states, like California, require that
automobile rates be approved prior to their use in the
marketplace.22 These states rely more on regulation than on
competition to modulate insurance rates.23 In California,
automobile insurance rates are approved in a two-step
process. The first step is the creation of a “rate plan.”24 The
rate plan considers the insurer’s entire book of business in
the relative line of insurance and asks the question: How
much total premium must the insurer collect in order to cover
the projected risks, overhead and permitted profit for that
line?25 The insurer then creates a “class plan.” The class
plan asks the question: How should different policyholders’
premiums be adjusted up or down based on the risks
presented by different groups or classes of policyholders?26
19. See id.
20. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179,
1187 (Ct. App. 2000); HUNTER, supra note 17, at 36–39.
21. See Rodney Griffin, New Technologies Rapidly Changing Auto Insurance
Business,
PROPERTY
CASUALTY
360°
(Feb.
10,
2011),
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2011/02/10/new-technologies-rapidlychanging-auto-insurance-b.
22. Wells, supra note 16, at 853.
23. See HUNTER, supra note 17.
24. See MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1431 (Ct. App.
2010).
25. See id. at 1436.
26. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179,
1201 (Ct. App. 2000).
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Among other factors, the Department of Insurance requires
that the rating factors comply with California law and be
justified by the loss experience for the group.27
Rating a new technology with an unproven track record
may include a considerable amount of guesswork. Of course,
those marketing AVs will have subjected the vehicles to
rigorous testing in an environment, one may assume,
congruent with those the auto is likely to encounter. These
test results, if shared with insurance companies, would give
some basis for rating the automobile. Nevertheless, insurers
may over or underestimate the frequency and severity of
future accidents. The rate may be excessive, or it may be
inadequate. Since one might expect that there will be few
AVs initially, an inadequate rate may not implicate serious
solvency issues for an insurer that has a large book of
traditional automobile insurance. A rate that turns out to be
excessive may be “unfairly discriminatory,” but the
practicalities of making a more accurate estimate based on
little or no experience would likely prove a defense to any
discrimination claim.
A. Some Insurance Issues Unique to California
California is the largest insurance market in the United
States, and it is the sixth largest among the countries of the
world.28 Cars are culture in this most populous state. There
are far more insured automobiles in California than any other
state.29 The California Department of Insurance employs
between 1200 and 1300 employees, including over eighty
lawyers.30 It works with a budget of approximately $150
million.31

27. See id. at 1201–04.
28. Analysis of 2006–07 Budget Bill, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE,
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2006/general_govt/gen_05_0845_anl06.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2012).
29. Auto Insurance, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.iii.org/
media/facts/statsbyissue/auto/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
30. Center for Insurance Law and Regulation, SANTA CLARA LAW,
http://law.scu.edu/insurancelaw/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
31. Marc Lifsher, California Insurance Commissioner to Gain More Power
TIMES
(Oct.
14,
2010),
from
Federal
Healthcare
Law,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/14/business/la-fi-insurance-commissioner20101014.
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Automobile insurance in California is governed by
Proposition 103, adopted by the voters in 1988.32 Proposition
103 has a history which may be instructive in understanding
some of the challenges to implementing AV coverage in
California.
1. Political History of Proposition 103
The historian Edward Gibbon often noted that the fate of
nations frequently turned on the “chance of arms.”33 The
phrase reflects that battles often have unpredictable
outcomes. One may think of Proposition 103 as the last
soldier still standing after the “Tort Wars” of the late 1980’s.34
In a 1986 skirmish, insurance and defense interests were
successful in persuading voters to adopt Proposition 51.35
Proposition 51 limited defendants’ responsibility for noneconomic harm to each defendant’s share of relative fault.36
This victory emboldened the defense side and galvanized the
opposition of those representing claimants’ interests.37 Each
drew its battle lines with proposed legislation and further
propositions.
Representatives of some of the warring parties agreed to
parle at Frank Fat’s restaurant in Sacramento. With then
Speaker of the House, Willie Brown, shuttling among the
belligerents’ tables, the parties outlined a treaty on a
Napkin.38 This has become known as the “Napkin Deal,” and

32. MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1440 (Ct. App. 2010).
The sections of Proposition 103 are found in CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861.01–1861.14
(West 2011).
33. EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE 399 (1831).
34. See Wells, supra note 16; Stephen D. Sugarman, California’s Insurance
Regulation Revolution: The First Two Years of Proposition 103, 27 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 683, 683–86 (2010); Regulation Modernization, INS. INFO. INST.,
http://www.iii.org/issue_updates/Regulation-Modernization.html (last visited
Apr. 23, 2012). Every decade seems to have its “Tort Wars.” See, e.g., Dan
Walters, Tort Wars Are Being Revived, MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEWS, Dec.
13, 1996, at 8B, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?
nid=2026&dat=19961213&id=T1996121BAJ&sj8qAAAAIBAJ&sjid=i9AFAAAA
IBAJ&pg=4443,1187484. The battles of the 1980’s, however, are most relevant
to the insurance issues presented by AVs.
35. See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1192 (1988).
36. See id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2011).
37. See Sugarman, supra note 34.
38. See Rodney R. Moy, Tobacco Companies, Immune No More—California’s
Removal of the Legal Barriers Preventing Plaintiffs from Recovering for
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a copy occupies a place of honor in the lobby of Frank Fat’s.39
It was too much to hope for “piece in our time,” but the
belligerents did agree to some modest legislative reforms and
a five-year armistice in which they would cease seeking tort
reform in either the legislature or by initiative.40 The
agreement included a disarmament provision in which the
parties entered into contracts with the main petition
signature gathering businesses in California in order to make
it difficult for them to work for either side during the
armistice.41
The legislative portion of the Napkin Deal passed
through the committees of both houses, was adopted by both
houses, and was signed by the Governor within three days of
the famous meal at Frank Fat’s.42 This seemed like unseemly
haste to many stakeholders who believed they had been
either left out of the negotiations or had been poorly
represented in the process.43 Consequently, an insurgency
formed among those who did not accept that they were bound
by the Napkin Deal.44
Thus, in 1988 the parties again cast their lot to the
chance of arms. This year saw five ballot initiatives directed
towards tort reform or insurance. Several were cunningly
designed so that, if they passed and received more votes than
a rival proposition that also passed, the one with the greater
number of votes would supplant the rival. When the cannon
thunder ceased and the smoke of battle cleared, Proposition
103 was the only proposition to pass.
Proposition 103 radically changed insurance law and
regulation in California. Among other things, it changed
California from a free-market state to a state in which most
rates charged by insurers are set by regulation.45 Even
though Proposition 103 promised voters a 20% roll back in

Tobacco-Related Illness, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 761, 770 (1998).
39. Id.
40. Id.; Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The
Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 543 (1999).
41. See JAMES RICHARDSON, WILLIE BROWN: A BIOGRAPHY 348–49 (1996).
42. See id.
43. See id. at 350–51.
44. Id. (“[T]he narrowness of the participation in the napkin deal brought a
narrow result. Consumer groups vowed to get even.”).
45. See 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 8 Cal. 4th 216, 299–300 (1994).
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their rates, it nevertheless passed by a slim margin46—less
than 51%.47 The voters never received their anticipated 20%
roll back—that portion of the Proposition was declared
unconstitutional.48 The California Supreme Court ruled that
it was “confiscatory” and held that insurers are entitled to a
“fair and reasonable” return on their investment.49
Invalidating the 20% roll back removed a major incentive
for voters to support the Proposition. Despite the slim
margin of victory, the Court nevertheless upheld the
Proposition’s severability clause and also upheld most of the
Proposition’s remaining provisions.50
These changes
included:
 Moving California from a state in which rates are
regulated by the market place to a state in which most
rates must receive prior approval (a “prior approval”
state in insurance parlance).51
 Changing the office of Commissioner of Insurance from
an appointed office to an elected office.52
Forbidding the charging of any rate unless the insurer files a
complete rate application with the commissioner.53
 Mandating a “Good-Driver” discount of at least twenty
percent (a discount, as explained later, that turns
largely on traffic convictions and/or “principally at-fault
accidents”).54

46. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01 (West 2011).
47. See Should State Regulate Health Insurance Premiums?, CAL.
HEALTHLINE (June 20, 2011), http://www.californiahealthline.org/thinktank/2011/should-state-regulate-health-insurance-premiums.aspx.
48. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 832 (1989).
49. Id. at 819. Based on Article II, section 12 of the California Constitution:
statutes may not identify “any private corporation to perform any function . . . .”
Id. The court also struck down the portion of Proposition 103 that created a
consumer-advocacy corporation.). CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10(c) (West 2011).
50. Calfarm Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d at 821–22, 839–41 (“[I]t seems eminently
reasonable to suppose that those who favor the proposition would be happy to
achieve at least some substantial portion of their purpose.”). Given the allure
and heavy promotion of the twenty percent role back, one may legitimately
wonder whether the voters understood the cross-subsidies and other
consequences of Proposition 103. Compare Nevada where their equivalent of
Proposition 103 was struck down in its entirety. See Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co. v.
Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 512–15 (9th Cir. 1990).
51. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(b).
52. Id. § 12900(a) (West 2006).
53. Id. § 1861.05(b) (West 2011).
54. Id. §§ 1861.02(b), 1861.025.
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 Requiring that the top three rating factors for auto
insurance must be, in descending order of importance:
(1) insured’s driving safety record, (2) miles driven
annually, and (3) years of driving experience.55

Whether prior approval or one of the more opencompetition based systems saves consumers money may be
fairly debated. Proposition 103 did little to address the major
costs that drive automobile insurance rates—the costs of
adjusting, defending and paying claims. Some restrictions
extend to executive compensation (at least to the extent that
it can be counted as a legitimate cost in rate making),56
efficiency standards for the costs of reasonably efficient
insurers,57 permitted rates of return,58 and maximum and
minimum permitted earned premium.59
One can argue that these are merely the icing on the
cake. The “cake” is the cost of the product being sold—
defending and paying claims.
Major cost containment
developments in this arena all occurred outside the purview
of Proposition 103. For example, Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s
Fund Insurance Co.60 eliminated third-party bad faith claims;
Thing v. La Chusa61 narrowed the circle of parties who may
recover for negligently caused emotional damages; State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell62
restricted the amount of punitive damages that may be
awarded for torts; Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions,
Inc.63 greatly reduced the amount recoverable under the

55. Id. § 1861.05(a).
56. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2644.10 (2008) (excluded expenses).
57. Id. tit. 10, § 2644.12 (efficiency standard).
58. Id. tit. 10, §§ 2644.15–2644.16.
59. Id. tit. 10, §§ 2644.2–2644.3.
60. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 304 (1988).
61. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 647 (1989).
62. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–17
(2003); see JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL
V. STATE FARM (2008). Bad faith judgments, one major source of punitive
damages, may not be counted as an expense for ratemaking purposes. CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2644.10(c). Punitive damages are sometimes not covered
either because directly or indirectly excluded by the policy language, or because
of public policy. See Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insuance for Punitive Damages,
1998 WIS. L. REV. 101 (1998); PPG Indus. Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co, 20 Cal.
4th 310, 318–19 (1999) (no coverage for punitive damages). Insurers may,
nevertheless, be obliged to defend a claim which includes punitive damages.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 162 Cal. App. 3d 939, 946 (Ct. App. 1984).
63. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 Cal. 4th 541, 548
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collateral source rule when medical bills are covered by
health insurance; California Civil Code section 3333.4
eliminated pain and suffering claims for injured drunk or
uninsured drivers; Truman v. Vargas64 established that
failure to wear a seat belt is contributory negligence; and
California Civil Code section 1431.2 (Proposition 51) limited
liability for noneconomic damages (i.e., pain and suffering) to
each defendant’s portion of fault.65 In addition, automobiles
are safer today than in the past, and the number of fatalities
per miles driven is steadily dropping.66 Insurers also have
developed more sophisticated ways to streamline and reduce
the costs of automobile repairs by, for example, adopting
arrangements with automobile repair facilities.67 All of these
changes in tort law, automobile design, and automobile repair
took palpable slices out of the cake and reduce the overall cost
of insuring drivers.
Although adopted by the barest majority, Proposition 103
may be amended by the legislature only by a two-thirds vote,
and then only if the legislation “further[s] [the] purposes” of
Proposition 103.68 Thus, Proposition 103 and the regulations
adopted by the Department of Insurance are the matrix in
which most (but not all) insurance is sold and regulated in
California.69
(2011). There is currently a bill before the California legislature to modify the
Howell decision. S.B. 1528, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
64. Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 983–84 (Ct. App. 1969).
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West 1988); see also CAL. CIV. CODE §
3333.2(a)–(b) (West 1988) (limiting pain and suffering in medical malpractice
cases to $250,000). The $250,000 cap, which was adopted in 1975, was not
indexed for inflation. In 2010 dollars the cap is worth only about $58,112.
Today it would cost about $1,001,569 to purchase what could be purchased for
$250,000 in 1975.
S. Morgan Friedman, THE INFLATION CALCULATOR,
http://www.westegg.com/inflation/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
66. See Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Traffic Safety Performance
(Core Outcomes) Measures for California, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/
departments/nrd-30/ncsa/STSI/6_CA/2008/6_CA_2008.htm (last visited Apr. 23,
2012).
67. See CAL. INS. CODE § 758.5 (West 1988) (insurer may not require
insured to use a particular auto repair facility, but insurer may truthfully
explain the benefits of using the automobile repair facility with which the
insurer has a relationship).
68. See Found. for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal.
App. 4th 1354, 1365–66 (Ct. App. 2005) (invalidating legislation that did not, in
the court’s view, further the purposes of Proposition 103).
69. For example, health insurance rates are not regulated in California.
There is currently a bill before the California Legislature, A.B. 52 2010–2011
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II. INSURANCE ISSUES AND AVS
A. Liability Coverage in the Standard Automobile Insurance
Contract
The standard automobile insurance contract contains a
bundle of coverages. Some are “first-party” coverages. These
coverages give a claim directly against the policyholder’s
insurer.70 Among these are: comprehensive (covering such
things a falling trees, collisions with animals, etc.), collision
(covering the policyholder’s automobile for damage to it from
other accidents whether or not there is fault on the part of
any party), medical payments coverage (“MedPay”—covering
medical expenses up to a usually fairly modest limit), and
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) (covering, up to a
limit, the insured person, family member, or person occupying
the covered automobile for their damages, including bodily
injury and pain and suffering, if they are legally entitled to
recover them from the owner or operator of an
uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle). There may also be
some other modest coverages, such as reimbursement for
towing and rental.
To the extent these coverages are triggered against one’s
own insurance company without the need of a finding of fault
on the part of anyone, they may not present interesting or
unique challenges in a world of AVs. Presumably, owners of
AVs will continue to want comprehensive, collision, MedPay,
and UM coverage for their vehicles, and presumably insurers
will continue to see a business opportunity in writing the
coverages.
The question becomes more perplexing, however, when
“liability” is required to trigger coverage. Liability almost
always turns on some level of fault. While it is common to
speak of an automobile as “covered,” in reality the liability
coverage under the policy only extends to a constellation of
people or entities who bear some relationship to the
automobile or the insured (e.g., the owner, the insured, the
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), and possibly a ballot initiative for the November 2012
ballot aimed at requiring approval of health insurance rates.
70. See Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 399 n.2 (1989)
(“[I]f the insured is seeking coverage against loss or damage sustained by the
insured, the claim is first party in nature. If the insured is seeking coverage
against liability of the insured to another, the claim is third party in nature.”).
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insured’s family, or a permissive driver of the car). Typical
language may provide words to the effect that the insurer will
pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which
any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an
auto accident.71 The policy will also provide that the insurer
will defend and, if it thinks appropriate, settle any such
claim. Similarly, UM coverage is triggered only when the
policyholder is “legally entitled” to recover from the other
motorist. In both cases, the coverage attaches only when
either the covered person or the owner or operator of the UM
vehicle is at fault. Fault usually requires negligence, and in
the context of automobiles, negligence usually flows from the
violation of one of the many rules of the road.72
If the owner properly maintains an AV and the vehicle
drives itself, there is a serious question whether the innocent
“driver” (if that is even a proper description of the person’s
role) is “legally” responsible. The coverage may not be
triggered because no one is either “legally responsible” or
“legally entitled.”
The State of Nevada recently adopted regulations for
licensing the testing of AVs in the state. The regulations
would require insurance in the minimum amounts required
for other cars “for the payment of tort liabilities arising from
the maintenance or use of the motor vehicle.”73
The
71. See, e.g., United Serv. Auto. Assn. v. Lilly, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1396, 1399
(Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added).
72. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(b) creates a rebuttable presumption that
violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation is a failure to exercise due care.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(b) (West 1988). There are exceptions. See, e.g., CAL.
VEH. CODE § 40831 (West 2007) (“In any civil action proof of speed in excess of
any prima facie limit declared in Section 22352 at a particular time and place
does not establish negligence as a matter of law but in all such actions it shall
be necessary to establish as a fact that the operation of a vehicle at the excess
speed constituted negligence.”) (emphasis added).
73. NEV. ADMIN. CODE. § 482.2(2) (2011). Any licensee who wishes to
operate for testing purposes an autonomous vehicle on any of the Nevada
highways must continuously maintain and:
a. Provide proof of liability insurance that is equal to or greater than
the minimum liability requirements for the State of Nevada:
1. In the amount of $15,000 for bodily injury to or death of one
person in any one accident;
2. Subject to the limit for one person, in the amount of $30,000 for
bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one
accident; and
3. In the amount of $10,000 for injury to or destruction of property
of others in any one accident, for the payment of tort liabilities
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regulation, however, does not suggest how the tort liability
may arise. If there is no fault on the part of the operator or
owner, then liability may arise, if at all, only for the
manufacturer or supplier. Manufacturers and suppliers are
not “insureds” under the standard automobile policy—at least
so far.
Thus, for the reasons stated above, owners,
manufacturers and suppliers may fall outside the coverage of
the policy.
Although the Nevada regulations do not clearly address
the rules governing tort liability, the regulations will make it
much easier to resolve issues surrounding the cause of
accidents. AVs licensed under the proposed regulations must
save the data for at least thirty seconds prior to any
collision.74 This feature should also reduce the costs of
resolving factual disputes.
At this writing, Bills addressing AVs are pending in other
states, including Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii and
Oklahoma.75 Doubtless many more will follow.

arising from the maintenance or use of the motor vehicle.
4. An operator’s policy will not be accepted by the Department as
proof of financial responsibility for an autonomous vehicle.
Id. A.B. 511, 76th Leg. Sess. (Nev. 2011) revised Nevada Revised Statutes, Ch.
483, to require the Nevada Department of Transportation to “[s]et forth
requirements for the insurance that is required to test or operate an
autonomous vehicle on a highway within this State.” NEV. REV. STAT. §
482A.100(b) (2011). The statute, however, does not address policy content or
related tort issues.
74. AVs must have:
[A] separate mechanism, in addition to, and separate from, any other
mechanism required by law, to capture and store the autonomous
technology sensor data for at least thirty seconds before a collision
occurs between the autonomous vehicle and another vehicle, object or
natural person while the vehicle is operating in autonomous mode. The
autonomous technology sensor data must be captured and stored in a
read-only format by the mechanism so that the data is retained until
extracted from the mechanism by an external device capable of
downloading and storing the data. Such data must be preserved for 2
years after the date of the collision.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.8(2)(b).
75. H.B. 2679, 47th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005); S.B. 1298 2011–2012 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2012); C.S./H.B. 1207, 2012 Leg. (Fla. 2012); H.B. 2238 26th Leg.
(Haw. 2012); H.B. 3007 2nd Sess. 53d Leg. (Okla. 2012). A web site that tracks
legislative developments with respect to autonomous vehicles is Automated
Driving: Legislative and Regulatory Action, THE CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC.,
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_Legislative_an
d_Regulatory_Action (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
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B. Possible Insurance Frameworks for AVs
Looking into this crystal ball, there are several
considerations that will weigh in favor of a continuing role for
automobile insurance. However safer AVs may be, they will
still be dangerous and will spin off injuries. The present
public policy that requires auto insurance, or proof of
sufficient assets to respond to damages at some level, will not
change.76 Because of the comprehensive adoption of rules of
the road, it is rare for an accident to occur where one or more
drivers, who all must carry insurance, is not at fault.77 If
there is no one at fault in a collision involving a fully
autonomous vehicle, how are injured members of the public to
be protected?
1. Products Liability
One possible approach would be to invoke the various
doctrines of products liability law. This would attach the
major liability to sellers and manufacturers of the vehicle.
However, it is doubtful that this is an acceptable approach for
several reasons. For example, while some accidents are
catastrophic, fortunately most accidents cause only modest
damages. By contrast, products liability lawsuits tend to be
complex and expensive.
Indeed, they may require the
translation of hundreds or thousands of engineering
documents—perhaps written in Japanese, Chinese or
Korean.78
The standards for establishing a design defect are vague
and unpredictable. In California, a design defect may be
established by either (1) showing the product “failed to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner,”79 or (2) showing, “through hindsight” the product’s
76. CAL. VEH. CODE § 16020 (West 2007).
77. Id. Collisions with pedestrians and other objects may or may not
implicate fault on the part of a driver. E.g., Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal. 2d 712, 714
(1953) (holding that driver who struck pedestrian was not negligent as a matter
of law).
78. See In re Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 687 F.2d 501, 505 (1st
Cir. 1982) (stating each party to bear translation costs of documents requested
by it but cost possibly taxable to prevailing party). Translation costs of
Japanese documents in range of $250,000, and translation costs of additional
Spanish documents may exceed that amount. Id.
79. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432 (1978).
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design embodies “excessive preventable danger.”80 If an
injured party can make a preliminary showing that the injury
was proximately caused by the “design” of the product, then
the burden of proof shifts to the supplier or manufacturer to
show that the product was not defective.81 When dealing with
a sophisticated product, the consumer expectation test may
be difficult to apply.82 The standard for establishing a
manufacturing defect may be equally vague and very
expensive to prove.83 Moreover, cars are designed to last, but
innovative companies may or may not exist at the time of an
accident—even General Motors narrowly avoided oblivion.84
2. Insurance Coverage After Acquisitions
Assuming much of the liability (and insurance) burden
were to switch to manufacturers or suppliers, difficult
insurance issues may arise when innovative companies enter
the market, leave the market, or are acquired by others.
Most policies insuring product risks are “occurrence” policies.
Claims arising during the policy period, whether known or
unknown, are covered. These policies typically contain a
clause forbidding assignment without the consent of the
insurer.85 This clause protects the insurer from additional,
un-bargained for risks the new enterprise may present.
An acquiring entity, either by operation of law or by
contractual assumption of liability, may be responsible for
injuries caused by the predecessor’s product. While coverage
of claims occurring after an acquisition would be governed by
80. Id. at 430.
81. “[W]e conclude that once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that
the injury was proximately caused by the product’s design, the burden should
appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors,
that the product is not defective.” Id. at 431.
82. Soule v. Gen. Motors Co., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 569–70 (1994) (consumer
expectation test inapplicable to crashworthiness of design because ordinary
consumer would have no idea how it should perform in crash). One could see
courts accepting similar arguments with respect to sophisticated computer
systems.
83. For example, was there a “bug” in the program? Were “bugs” expected
in innovative technology?
84. See Nick Bunkley, G.M. Drops Application for Federal Energy Loan,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/business/28
auto.html?_r=1&ref=autoindustry.
85. A typical clause may read: “Assignment of interest under this policy
shall not bind the [insurer] until its consent is endorsed hereon.” Kenneth C.
Newa, Corporate Successor Liability: Insurer’s Perspective, 41 BRIEF 60 (2011).
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the restriction on assignment, what coverage exists for preacquisition occurrences? One may argue that the bargained
for risk, the “occurrence,” has already attached, thus there is
no enhanced risk to the insurer by permitting assignment of
the coverage to the successor entity.
The leading Ninth Circuit case, Northern Insurance Co.
v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.86 so held (at least as to
liability imposed as a matter of law from the sale of the
predecessor’s assets). Regardless of the characteristics of the
successor, “the insurer still covers only the risk it had
evaluated when it wrote the policy.”87
Unfortunately, the issue is no longer so straightforward.
In a later asset acquisition case, in which the acquiring party
assumed all liabilities by contract, the California Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the benefits of the policy
can be assigned with respect to a pre-acquisition occurrence
that has not been “reduced to a sum of money due or to
become due under the policy.”88 Such an inchoate claim does
not rise to the level of an assignable “chose in action” under
California law.89 Additionally, the insurer’s risk may be
increased because the insurer’s duty to defend may now
extend to two entities (the transferor and the transferee),
rather than to the one entity that was the insured under the
original bargain.90 The Court left open the question of
whether coverage rights would have existed had the liability
arisen as a matter of law. Other courts have adopted slightly
more nuanced positions. 91
86. N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th
Cir. 1992).
87. Id. at 1358.
88. Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 29 Cal. 4th 934, 945
(2007).
89. Id. at 944.
90. Id. at 944–45.
91. In Pilkington North America v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., the
policy was assignable because “a chose in action arises under an occurrencebased policy at the time of the covered loss.” Pilkington N. Am. v. Travelers
Cas. & Sur. Co., 861 N.E.2d 121, 129 (Ohio 2006). The court left open the
transferability of the right to a defense. Id. at 129. By contrast, the court in
Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., held the rights assignable
only if at the moment of assignment “the policyholder could have brought its
own action against the insurer for coverage . . . . [A]t a minimum the losses
must have been reported to give rise to the chose in action.” Travelers Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 895 N.E.2d 1172, 1180 (Ind. 2008). Other cases
collected and suggestions on how to structure acquisitions are included in
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If the product seller is extant and has sufficient assets,
the vagaries of coverage are largely a headache for the
company rather than the injured party. Since coverage
follows the company, not the vehicle, when the company no
longer exists or is undercapitalized these issues will add an
additional layer of uncertainty for parties injured by AVs.
Placing the insurance burden solely on the manufacturer
or supplier also presents issues of adverse selection and moral
hazard discussed below. Public policy would, therefore,
strongly suggest that there should be a party both financially
responsible and reasonably accessible. Assuming public
entities are not willing to assume the insurance burden, there
are several possible approaches that bear strong analogies to
current law.
Even if products liability concepts were to dominate this
area, there still may be some role for fault-based liability on
the part of AV owners. Like automobile tires and brakes,
owners have a responsibility for maintenance and have a
responsibility to respond if the automobile shows signs that it
is acting in an untoward way. Once an owner is or should be
aware that the automobile is not acting as it should, the
owner may be negligent in continuing to drive the car until
the issue is adequately addressed.92 Owners would likely
want to insure against this possible liability.
3. Strict Liability When an AV Is “At Fault”
Present law in California makes the owner of a vehicle
responsible, up to the minimum required coverage for liability
insurance, for accidents caused by the fault of any permissive
user of the automobile.93 Thus, when the actual driver is at
fault, the owner is liable without fault for the driver’s
actions.94 Perhaps the next step might be to make the owner
liable when the owner’s automobile is “at fault” in the sense
that it violates one of the many rules of the road that would

Newa, supra note 85; Joseph Thacker et al., Do Rights Transfer Under
Occurrence-Based General Liability Insurance Policies After the Sale of a
Business?, 41 BRIEF 52 (2011).
92. Fremont Comp. Ins. Co. v. Hartnett, 19 Cal. App. 4th 669, 675–77 (Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that defendant’s failure to maintain brakes raised a
presumption of negligence).
93. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150 (West 2007).
94. See Wildman v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 39–40 (1957).
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have imposed liability on a human driver. If tort law were to
take this step, owners would want this liability insured.
Owner liability for permissive drivers, at least as
presently constructed, is capped at a very modest amount.95
Under the current liability regime, drivers, however, must
respond for all the damages for which they are responsible.
Assuming drivers have or may have assets, they are
motivated to insure well beyond these modest limits. Thus,
under the present structure, injured parties often have
available assets well beyond the minimum limits.96
Policymakers, such as legislatures, will have to decide
whether strict liability, perhaps with a cap in the absence of
fault, is an acceptable response for parties injured by AVs.
Another small step, which may require legislation, might
involve accepting an analogy to agency law. An autonomous
automobile is very much like a driver hired by the owner. It
is doing the owner’s bidding, and if the car violates the rules
of the road and causes an injury, perhaps the owner or the
one instructing the automobile should be liable as they would
be for a similar injury caused by the conduct of an agent.97
Name the car “Jeeves,” and the step may be easier to accept.98
Courts and legislatures have been somewhat ambivalent
about this approach. While imposing limited owner liability
by statute for the fault of a permissive user, at the same time
the courts (at least in California) long ago abandoned the
“Family Purpose Doctrine”—a doctrine which, when
applicable, made any driver of the car for a family purpose
the agent of the owner.99 In another example of ambivalence,

95. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1 (West 1988); CAL. VEH. CODE § 17151(a)
(West 2007).
96. See id.
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2295 (West 2011) (defining “agent”). This would be
similar to the doctrine of respondeat superior where an employer is liable for
the acts of his employee so long as the acts are within the scope of employment.
Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, 41 Cal. 3d 962, 967 (1986); Tyson v. Romey, 88
Cal. App. 2d 752, 755 (Ct. App. 1948); see Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and
Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739
(1996).
98. See the many humorous stories by P.G. Wodehouse about Bertie
Wooster and his clever butler, Jeeves. E.g., Carry on Jeeves, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carry_on,_Jeeves. The adventures of the sagacious
valet were presented in the 1990s British sitcom “Jeeves and Wooster.” Jeeves
and Wooster (ITV television broadcast 1990–93).
99. Johnson v. Peterson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 619, 624, 624 n.4 (Ct. App. 1974).
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California rejected the liability of a driver for non-negligent
brake failure, but held the driver could be liable for the
negligence of the mechanic who had serviced the brakes.100
Although liability of the driver required fault on the part of
someone (the automobile mechanic), the duty to maintain the
brakes in a non-negligent manner was a “nondelegable
duty.”101 The Court was persuaded, in part, because the
Vehicle Code at the time provided that every motor vehicle
“shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the
movement of the vehicle and to stop and hold the vehicle.”102
The Vehicle Code also provided that all “[b]rakes and
component parts thereof shall be maintained . . . in good
working order.”103 There is little difference between a defect
The doctrine is still applied in some states. See Nelson v. Johnson, 599 N.W.2d
246, 248 (N.D. 1999) (“The respondeat superior theoretical basis for the doctrine
is a fiction created in furtherance of the public policy of giving an injured party
a cause of action against a financially responsible defendant.”).
100. Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 448 (1968). In the context of workplace
injuries to employees of independent contractors hired by the defendant, the
nondelegable duty doctrine has had a tortured history in California. See
SeaBright Ins. v. U.S. Airways, 52 Cal. 4th 590, 601–03 (2011).
101.
Unlike strict liability, a nondelegable duty operates, not as a substitute
for liability based on negligence, but to assure that when a negligently
caused harm occurs, the injured party will be compensated by the
person whose activity caused the harm and who may therefore properly
be held liable for the negligence of his agent, whether his agent was an
employee or an independent contractor. To the extent that recognition
of nondelegable duties tends to insure that there will be a financially
responsible defendant available to compensate for the negligent harms
caused by that defendant’s activity, it ameliorates the need for strict
liability to secure compensation.
Maloney, 60 Cal. 2d at 446 n.32. The court noted that “[h]e is the party
primarily to be benefited by its use; he selects the contractor and is free to insist
upon one who is financially responsible and to demand indemnity from him; the
cost of his liability insurance that distributes the risk is properly attributable to
his activities.” Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
102. Maloney, 60 Cal. 2d at 444.
103. Id. at 444. Proposed AV regulations in Nevada may possibly be read as
endorsing strict liability when an AV violates a rule of the road. NEV. ADMIN.
CODE § 484.1(a)(3) provides:
A vehicle with autonomous technology shall comply with the statutes
and regulations applicable to operation of a vehicle on a highway:
a. Compliance with the statutes and regulations applicable to
operation of a vehicle on a highway may be achieved with or
without a driver depending on the capabilities of the vehicle’s
autonomous technology; and
b. If a driver is necessary due to limitations of the autonomous
technology, the limitations must be defined in the autonomous
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that causes the vehicle to fail to brake and a defect that
causes the brakes to fail. Again, if legislatures, courts, or
regulators were to endorse either the agency or nondelegable
duty approach in order to give injured parties protection
similar to what they now enjoy (an accessible, legally and
financially responsible party), automobile owners would need
to insure against the risk.
Regardless of what liability scheme is adopted, if there is
any chance of suits against owners, they will want insurance
for the purpose of tendering their defense, indemnifying
losses, or adjusting losses, whether or not suits are filed.
Auto manufactures that do not have a network of insurance
adjusters may be ill-suited to deal with the daily grist of auto
accidents.
If a design or manufacturing defect in an AV
substantially contributed to an accident, an insurer that
insured and indemnified the car owner would be free to
pursue a claim against the manufacturer.104 Likewise, an
injured party could similarly pursue a products liability claim
should the insurance coverage prove inadequate.105 Claims
exceeding the coverage are more likely to be large enough to
justify the expense.

technology’s owner’s manual; and
If a driver is not necessary, the autonomous technology shall be
granted all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties
applicable to the driver of a vehicle, except those provisions
which by their nature can have no application.
ADMIN. § 484.1(a)(3) (2011) (emphasis added). A more recent proposed
regulation (Dec. 27, 2011), section 482A.3 of the Nevada Administative
Code provides: “[A] person shall be deemed the operator of an autonomous
vehicle which is operated in autonomous mode when the person causes the
autonomous vehicle to engage, regardless of whether the person is
physically present in the vehicle while it is engaged.” Id. (emphasis added).
Section (4)(2) provides that:
For the purpose of enforcing the traffic laws and other laws applicable
to drivers and motor vehicles operated in this State, the operator of an
autonomous vehicle that is operated in autonomous mode shall be
deemed the driver of the autonomous vehicle regardless of whether the
person is physically present in the autonomous vehicle while it is
engaged.
ADMIN. § 482A.4(2). It is not clear whether this regulation would impose a
nondelegable tort duty on the “vehicle” or on the “autonomous technology,” or on
the “operator” or “driver,” nor is it clear how it would do so.
104. See 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY
57–62 (3d ed. 2011).
105. See id.
c.
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4. First-Party Insurance
To the extent that liability of the owner or driver
diminishes or disappears altogether, injured parties may
prefer to look towards first-party, rather than third party
insurance, to make them as whole as possible. Health
insurance covering treatment and rehabilitation is an
example of first-party insurance.106
One obstacle is that first-party insurance, with rare
exception, does not compensate for pain and suffering,
disfigurement, and other items of general damages. A
notable exception is the UM coverage mentioned above.107
This coverage allows the insured to claim against the
insured’s own insurer the full constellation (up to the policy
limits) of damages resulting from a collision with an
uninsured or underinsured motorist who is liable for the
damages.108 In the new world of truly autonomous vehicles,
one could imagine a market for expanding this coverage to
include first-party coverage for injuries caused by AVs when
there is no liability on the part of the owner of the other
vehicle. Somewhat like no-fault insurance, injured parties
would look first to their own insurers.109
III. INSURANCE RATES AND POLICIES FOR AVS
Assuming a continuing role for auto insurance in the
world of AVs, it may be useful to look at automobile insurance
in general, and at California in particular, to understand
some of the issues that may arise.

106. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 399 n.2 (1989)
(“[I]f the insured is seeking coverage against loss or damage sustained by the
insured, the claim is first party in nature. If the insured is seeking coverage
against liability of the insured to another, the claim is third party in nature.”).
107. See supra Part II.A.
108. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 2006).
109. California offers some no-fault options for insurance. As noted above,
some of the coverages in standard automobile policies are first-party, no-fault
coverages. See Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Yolo Cnty. Sup. Court, 135 Cal. App.
4th 263, 268 (Ct. App. 2005); Nager v. Allstate Ins. Co., 83 Cal. App. 4th 284,
289–90 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Automobile med-pay insurance provides first-party
coverage on a no-fault basis for relatively low policy limits (generally ranging
from $5,000 to $10,000) at relatively low premiums. The coverage is primarily
designed to provide an additional source of funds for medical expenses for
injured automobile occupants without all the burdens of a fault-based payment
system.”) (citations omitted).
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Insurance rates discriminate. All insurers categorize
levels of risk and charge premiums in accordance with their
perception of the risk. Risk usually is a combination of
frequency and severity of claims and other costs associated
with a transfer of risk among different classes of
policyholders.110 Virtually all states, including California,
prohibit insurance rates that are “unfairly discriminatory.”111
Discrimination, in this sense, is not a term intended to apply
only to suspect classes—such as race or religion—but is a
term intended to suggest that rates, so far as practical, reflect
relative risks.112
While the words “unfairly discriminatory” may suggest
an element of moral taint, the provenance of the phrase was
very practical. The 1871 Chicago fire and the 1906 California
earthquake and fire sent many insurers into insolvency.113
One cause was aggressive rate competition in which those
with influence and power could demand rates below their
relative risk.114 This either put the insurer’s solvency at risk,
or the inadequate rate charged to some required that an
excessive rate be charged to others. Whether or not one
considers this “unfair,” it also has practical implications.
Those who are charged too much will tend to buy less or not
buy insurance at all. Those who are charged too little will
tend to buy more insurance and, possibly, engage in the
insured activity at an inefficient or careless level.115
This, in the industry, is called “adverse selection” or
“moral hazard.” When adverse selection or moral hazard
work their mischief, an insurer or industry may go into a
“death spiral”: as more people buy insurance priced at less
than the risk, more people decline to buy insurance priced at
110. MATTHEW J. HASSETT & DONALD STEWART, PROBABILITY FOR RISK
MANAGEMENT 357 (2009).
111. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West 2011).
112. See Miller, supra note 11, at 276.
113. HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE BETWEEN GLOBAL
DYNAMICS AND LOCAL CONTINGENCIES 31 (J. David Cummins & Bertrand
Venard eds., 2007).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Mark Calabria, Bad for Taxpayers and Whales, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 27 2011, 11:34 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/30/
who-benefits-from-federal-flood-aid/federal-flood-aid-bad-for-taxpayers-andwhales (stating under-pricing of Federal flood insurance program encouraged
building in otherwise unsuitable flood plains as well as inflicted harm on
whales).
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more than the risk,116 and those with insurance behave more
recklessly than they otherwise would. As this happens, it
becomes difficult or impossible for the insurer to make its
business a “zero-sum-game.” Quite apart from considerations
of fairness to policyholders, it becomes increasingly difficult
for an insurer to make up for charging too little for a risk by
charging others too much. To the extent public policy
encourages insurance, the policy is undermined because those
charged too much are likely to underinsure or drop out of the
insurance pool altogether.117 In the worst cases, the result
may be insolvency of the insurer.
A. Rating Factors
Although there are many potential rating factors that
insurers may use to evaluate risk, practicality and politics
limit their scope. A rating factor that is impractical or
expensive to administer is not workable. For example, it may
be best to measure an insured’s driving habits by placing an
agent of the insurer as a passenger with the insured for a
week or two. This is not practical, although Progressive
Insurance’s heavily promoted new “Snapshot” policy (an
electronic monitor in the car records the driver’s driving
habits) is a high-tech surrogate for the ride-along agent.118
Other insurers are now offering similar policies.
Territorial rating (usually by zip code) is highly
predictive of risk of loss. Some argue, though, that territorial
rating, although neutral on its face, de facto discriminates
against minorities and the poor because they tend to live in
disproportionate numbers in higher risk neighborhoods.119
116. See MICHAEL G. FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING
SYSTEMIC RISKS 109 (2003).
117. See id.; Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 307 (1937). “It
is no longer open to question that the business of insurance is affected with a
public interest. Neither the company nor a policyholder has the inviolate rights
that characterize private contracts. The contract of the policyholder is subject
to the reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.” Id. The California
Insurance Code spans 1271 single-space, size ten-font pages and ends with
section 16030.
See DIMUGNO & GLAD, CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAWS
ANNOTATED 76–1347 (2011).
118. Snapshot, PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE, http://www.progressive.com/auto/
snapshot-discount.aspx (last visted Apr. 23, 2012).
119. Gary Williams, “The Wrong Side of the Tracks”: Territorial Rating and
the Setting of Automobile Liability Insurance Rates in California, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 845, 846–47 (1992). Others disagree. See Miller, supra note 11, at
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The California Commissioner, perhaps acceding to this
concern, permits territorial rating to be used, but at a level of
significance below its true weight.120
Credit scoring presents a similar political tug-o’-war.
Although lively debates surround why one’s credit score
actuarially relates to risk of loss (is there a causation, a mere
correlation, or something else?), insurers claim an actuarially
relevant correlation.121 In a time of economic stress, such as
now, there is strong political support for disallowing credit
scoring as a rating factor. Even during more flush times, the
argument that credit scoring disadvantages protected groups
(e.g., racial minorities) enjoys resonance. Consequently, the
availability of credit scoring as a rating factor is highly
contentious. California’s Commissioner does not allow credit
scoring as a rating factor.122 Texas does allow it.123 In a
referendum, Oregon voters defeated a ballot measure that
would have prohibited credit scoring.124
Gender politics also plays a role. It is common knowledge
that young drivers—especially young male drivers—are less
safe than more experienced and mature drivers. Long before
automobiles and tourist busses crowded the streets of
Stratford-upon-Avon, Shakespeare recognized this trait.
Referring to young men, Shakespeare wrote: “I would there
were no age between sixteen and three-and-twenty; or that
youth would sleep out the rest; for there is nothing in the

276.
120. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179,
1187 (Ct. App. 2000); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2632.5, 2632.7, 2632.8 (2008).
Prior to 1995 regulations permitted California auto insurers to average the
sixteen optional rating factors. If the average weight was less than the weight
given to the number of years of driving experience (the third-ranked mandatory
rating factor), the insurer was in compliance with Proposition 103 and the
pertinent regulations. Commissioner John Garamendi, as one of his last acts
before leaving office, revised the regulation so that each optional factor must be
weighted lower than years of driving experience. Written Testimony of the
California Farm Bureau Federation, In re proposed Amendment of title 10
California Code of Regulations, Section 2632.8—Optional Automobile Insurance
Rating Factors (Mar. 6, 2006) (on file at Santa Clara University School of Law).
121. James E Monaghan, The Impact of Personal Credit History on Loss
Performance in Personal Lines, CAS. ACT. SOC. E-FORUM, Winter 2000, at 79,
102–03, http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/00wforum/00wf079.pdf.
122. See tit. 10, § 2632.5.
123. See Ojo v. Farmers Grp. Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 441–43 (Tex. 2011).
124. Oregon Voters Defeat Credit Scoring Ballot Measure, INS. J. (Nov. 8,
2006), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2006/11/08/74099.htm.
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between, but getting wenches with child, wronging the
ancientry, stealing, fighting—Hark you now!” 125
Over their lives, men, women and transgendered
individuals also present different constellations of health care
costs. Should insurers be permitted to use these gender
differences as rating factors in setting health or auto
insurance
premiums?
Ambivalence,
or
perhaps
schizophrenia, characterizes California’s current approaches
to the issue.
California recently passed legislation
prohibiting the use of gender when setting premiums for
health policies.126 Gender neutrality vanishes, however, when
rating auto insurance.
Shakespeare’s common sense
observation still enjoys currency—gender is an approved
rating factor for auto insurance.127 Moreover, the California
legislature has the legislative prerogative (subject to federal
standards) to set rating factors for health insurance. They do
not enjoy the same legislative prerogative with respect to
automobile insurance rating factors.128
While one may applaud gender neutrality in insurance
rating as an enlightened step, this may ignore the
gravitational pull of market forces. Unless the insurance is
either de jure or de facto required (qualities enjoyed by
automobile insurance and, perhaps, health insurance), those
paying too much are likely to forgo coverage, minimize

125. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A WINTER’S TALE act III, sc. iii (Henry N.
Hudson, ed., Boston, Ginn & Co. 1898). Some editions widen the age of
foolishness to “ten and three-and-twenty.” See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A
WINTER’S TALE, act III, sc. iii (Cross and T. Brooke, ed., Yale Univ. 1993).
Shakespeare should know. He got Anne Hathaway with child when he was
eighteen years old and married her in some haste. STEPHEN GREENBLATT,
WILL IN THE WORLD 120–21 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2004).
126. CAL. INS. CODE § 10140.2(a) (West 2006) (“Notwithstanding Section
10140, a health insurance policy issued, amended, or renewed on or after
January 1, 2011, shall not be subject to premium, price, or charge differentials
because of the sex of any contracting party, potential contracting party, or
person reasonably expected to benefit from the policy as a policyholder, insured,
or otherwise.”). Subsection (b) included gender identity within the definition of
“sex.” INS. § 10140.2(b). Regulations to implement gender neutrality for sexual
identity are presently pending before the California Department of Insurance.
40-2 Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 1647, Oct. 14, 2011.
127. Tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(9) (stating optional rating factor Number 9 includes
“Gender of the rated driver.”).
128. Found. for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal. App.
4th 1354, 1372 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating Commissioner of Insurance, rather than
legislature, is empowered to adopt optional rating factors).
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coverage, or seek alternatives. The favored group is also
likely to purchase too much because it is a “good deal.” If the
difference in cost or value is palpable, in the fullness of time
those paying too much may fade from the market, and those
paying too little, absent the subsidy flowing to them from
those paying too much, will find themselves in a pool of only
those formally favored by the rating cross-subsidy. This pool,
then, will pay the appropriate rates for their risk, and any
benefit from the cross-subsidy, from those who might have
paid too much, should disappear.
Of course, AVs do not have gender or credit ratings. The
vehicles are, however, garaged in disparate zip codes and are
driven in localities and at times (e.g., busy commute hours
compared with off-peak hours) presenting disparate risks. It
is even possible that different operating systems or hardware,
like different drivers, may present different risk profiles.
Aging hardware is likely analogous to aging drivers. How all
this will play out, and who will call the plays (legislatures,
insurers, commissioners) will be interesting.
If those injured by driverless vehicles were left with only
a claim against the manufacturer (a “products liability”
claim), similar dislocations may occur. Apart from expense
and complexity, opting for products liability suits as the main
avenue for compensating injuries invites some other adverse
consequences. The products liability insurer is in a poor
position to rate the policy based on the relevant traits of the
vehicle driver or owner. Thus, many rating factors, such as
annual miles driven, territory, use, and multiple vehicle
discounts, would be irrelevant or nearly so.129
Since the manufacturer cannot rate the individual
purchaser, the rates passed through to the purchaser will be
based on average driver/owner traits over the pool of
driver/owners.
This may result in cross-subsidies and
adverse selection.
A simple example: the frequency of
accidents is closely related to the number of miles driven.
When setting rates130 an insurance company accounts for the
number of miles driven by the insured and the particular use

129. A fully autonomous vehicle should eliminate the possibility of human
error.
130. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179,
1184 (Ct. App. 2000).
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(e.g., commuting or pleasure) to which the vehicle is put. A
manufacturer would not. There is a fairly linear relationship
between the number of miles driven and the risk. Assume
that $100 per year represents the mileage risk when a car is
driven 1000 miles per year. Let’s assume that $2000 would
be the appropriate premium for a car driven 20,000 miles per
year. If the average annual mileage for the manufacturer’s
fleet of AVs is 10,000 miles annually, one would expect the
product liability insurance load for the manufacturer to be
approximately $1000 per year per car multiplied by the
average life of the cars. This cost would be passed on to the
purchasers in the up-front price of the car, perhaps spread
over time if financed.
Thus, drivers who drive only 2000 miles would be
charged too much, and drivers who drive 20,000 miles would
be charged too little. Consequently, drivers of AVs, like
diners at an all-you-can-eat restaurant, would be inclined to
drive too much (“Moral Hazard”).131 Low mileage drivers, who
are charged too much, would also more likely select ordinary
cars over AVs because ordinary cars are more accurately
rated and, therefore, less expensive to operate. Those driving
more than average would more likely select AVs because they
are charged too little (“Adverse Selection”).
This also
undermines whatever benefits flow from the new Pay-As-YouDrive policies. Likewise, a driver who instructs the car to
drive conservatively (assuming the future holds such
possibilities) would pay the same insurance as one who
instructs the car to drive more aggressively (e.g., entering a
command to change into a faster lane whenever possible).
Both examples would encourage overuse or possibly misuse of
the product.
As current rating factors for self-driving vehicles lose
relevance,132 the manufacturer’s inability to reflect these
rating factors in the price is also irrelevant. Moreover, the
statutes and regulations applying to automobile policies
under Proposition 103 simply do not apply to the commercial
general liability, products liability, or multi-risk policies that
131. One might argue that the high mileage driver may replace the car more
frequently, thus paying an additional “premium” with the more frequent
purchases.
132. For example, driving safety record, years of driving experience,
academic standing, non-smoker, to name a few.
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suppliers and manufacturers purchase to cover risks from
their products. These are not automobile policies within the
definition of Proposition 103 and California Insurance Code
section 660(a). Indeed, suppliers and manufacturers, unlike
automobile owners, are free to forgo insurance altogether.
B. Examples of Difficulty in Setting Rates for New
Technologies
1. Airbags
One may cite two examples where the move from testing
to real life experience diverged. When airbags were first
introduced, they were estimated to save 9000 lives per year.133
However, between 1987 and 2001 airbags saved 8369 lives
and caused approximately 291 deaths between 1990 and July
2008.134 Thus, an insurer basing its rates on the estimated
efficacy of air bags would have missed the mark. Even with
the benefit of hindsight, however, past is not necessarily
prologue. During this same period airbags consistently
improved. On/Off switches were added, the deployment force
was reduced, sensors were added to adjust to an occupant’s
weight and seat position, and air bags were no longer
marketed as a substitute for seatbelts.135 One can anticipate
that the technology enabling AVs, much like today’s
computers, will rapidly advance in such a way that
predictions from prior experience may be very poor predictors
of future loss trends.
2. ABS Brakes
The second example is ABS brakes.136
When first
introduced, many assumed that they would reduce accident
133. NIDHI KALRA ET AL., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES 38 (2009), http://www.dot.ca.gov/research/research
reports/reports/2009/prr-2009-28_liability_reg_&_auto_vehicle_final_report_200
9.pdf; Paul Eisenstein, Airbags Arrive, Muffling an Almost 20 Year Debate, CHI.
TRIB.
(Sept.
3,
1989),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-09-03/
travel/8901100288_1_air-bags-equipped-new-cars.
134. KALRA ET AL., supra note 134, at 39.
135. Id.
136. The system prevents wheels from locking during braking, thus
maximising traction and helping the vehicle avoid going into a skid. Questions
and Answers Regarding Antilock Brake Sytem (ABS), NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ASSOC., http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/problems/equipment/absbrakes.html
(last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
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costs. For a brief period after their introduction, however,
accidents actually increased.137 The increase was due to the
unfamiliarity with the operation and feel of ABS brakes.138
Many drivers, when they sensed the judder of the brakes as
they adjusted to the insipient skid of a wheel, assumed the
brakes were not working properly and pumped the brakes or
otherwise reacted in a way that reduced their effectiveness.139
Other drivers may have been encouraged to drive more
aggressively in reliance on the new ABS systems.140
C. Proposition 103 and AVs
Proposition 103 applies to rates and premiums for
automobile policies “as described in subdivision (a) of Section
660” of the California Insurance Code.141 Section 660(a)
defines “policy” as any:
[A]utomobile liability, automobile physical damage, or
automobile collisions policy, or any combination thereof
. . . insuring a single individual or individuals residing in
the same household [if the automobile is] a motor vehicle
of the private passenger or station wagon type that is not
used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers, nor
rented to others.142

Thus, as presently drafted, the provisions of Proposition 103
will govern the insuring of AVs owned by individuals.
137. Anti-Lock
Brakes,
HIGHWAY
SAFETY
RES.
AND
COMM.,
http://www.iihs.org/research/qanda/antilock.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Self-Driving Cars: Safer at Any Speed?, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21548992.
141. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a) (West 2011). To the extent insurers were to
offer and policyholders were to purchase first-party coverage to insure
themselves against, for example, pain and suffering, California Insurance Code
section 660 may or may not include that kind of policy within its ambit. The
question would turn on whether the policy would be one for “automobile liability
coverage.” Section 660(b) provides “ ‘ automobile liability coverage’ includes only
coverage of bodily injury and property damage liability, medical payments, and
uninsured motorists coverage.” CAL. INS. CODE § 660(b) (West 2011) (emphasis
added). One could argue that a first-party policy covering the policyholder’s
general damages, such as pain and suffering, was not a “liability” policy. On the
other hand, the policy creates a “liability” on the part of the insurer, therefore it
may be a policy with “coverage of bodily injury . . . liability.” Id. Since the
definition of “automobile liability coverage” includes “medical payments,” and
the MedPay provisions of a policy do not require liability on the part of anyone
other than the insurer, this definition is at least plausible. Id.
142. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 660(a)–(a)(1).
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The Commissioner of Insurance must approve all rating
factors.143 While the Commissioner has discretion to approve
and rank some rating factors, so long as they “have a
substantial relationship to the risk of loss”144 (referred to as
the “optional rating factors”), Proposition 103 requires that
the three most important rating factors determining rates
and premiums (referred to as the “mandatory rating factors”)
must be, in the following order: (1) the
insured’s
driving
safety record, (2) the number of miles he or she drives
annually, and (3) the number of years of driving experience
the insured has had.145
This order of ranking, however, does not necessarily
reflect the relative weight of each factor. Thus, to comply
with Proposition 103’s mandated ranking, insurers must
artificially increase or decrease the actual predictive value
placed on these (and other) rating factors to preserve this
hierarchy.146 This is called “pumping” when the value of a
rating factor is increased to move it up in the hierarchy and
“tempering” when the value of a stronger rating factor is
artificially decreased in order to move it down in the rating
order.147 For example, annual miles driven may better predict
risk of loss than driving safety record. Driving safety record,
however, must be the most important rating factor.148 In
order to comply with Proposition 103 an insurer must
“temper” the importance of the annual mileage and/or “pump”
the importance of the driving safety record in order to comply
with the order mandated by Proposition 103.149 Pumping,
tempering, or combining the two, is an example of how the
auto rating factor regulations allow or even compel arbitrary
rate setting. Two insurers with identical sets of costs and
facts can arrive at different rates depending on how each
approaches the pumping/tempering “fix.”

143. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a)(4).
144. Id.
145. Id.; see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.5(c)(2)(C) (2008) (listing
approved auto rating factors).
146. Tit. 10, § 2632.8(d); see Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85
Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1190–91 (Ct. App. 2000).
147. The process of pumping and tempering is discussed in Spanish Speaking
Citizens’ Found., 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1229–37.
148. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a).
149. Id.
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Pumping and tempering applies both to the three
mandatory rating factors and to some optional rating factors.
For example, territory (where a car is garaged or driven) may
be more predictive than any, or indeed all, of the three
mandatory rating factors. Nevertheless, it must be tempered,
or the three mandatory rating factors must be pumped, in
order to keep territory ranked below the three mandatory
rating factors.150 Indeed, current regulations require insurers
to weigh territory below both the mandatory rating factors
and any optional rating factors the insurer uses.151
Tempering the territorial rating factor below its true
value may well cause a wealth transfer from insureds who
garage their cars in low risk territories to insureds who
garage their cars in higher risk areas. This means, for
example, that rural drivers may pay more for insurance than
their risk justifies.
Urban drivers, subsidized by the
overpayments of rural drivers, pay less. If one looks at
mandatory auto insurance as somewhat akin to a tax, this
presents the prospect of a regressive tax—rural insureds,
while paying more than their risk suggests, are generally less
affluent than urban insureds.152 Likewise, pumping years of
driving experience above more predictive optional rating
factors means, quite simply, that the age of drivers counts too
much. Put another way, risks presented by differences in
years of driving experience must be exaggerated. Since risk
increases with younger drivers and also increases with older
drivers, these two groups must pay higher premiums than is
justified by the risk they present. Thus, in both of these
examples it may be argued that, rather than protecting
consumers in general, some consumer groups “win,” and
others “lose.” Whether this cross-subsidy is good policy is a
political judgment made by Proposition 103 and by the
Commissioner of Insurance when implementing both
Proposition 103 and the optional rating factors that fall
150. See tit. 10, § 2632.7.
151. Tit. 10, § 2632.7(b)(4) (“[T]he order of analysis of the optional factors
shall be determined by the insurer, with the exception that frequency band and
severity band [these are referred to as the territorial rating factors] shall be
analyzed last.”).
152. Written Testimony of the California Farm Bureau Federation, In re
proposed Amendment of title 10 California Code of Regulations, Section
2632.8—Optional Automobile Insurance Rating Factors, Mar. 6, 2006 (on file at
Santa Clara University School of Law).
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within the Commissioner’s aegis.
When these cross-subsidies become palpable, it can result
in adverse selection. An insured who is charged too little for
annual mileage because the mileage rating factor has been
tempered below its predictive value is likely to drive more
miles than he or she would have, if charged the higher rate.
The result is similar when annual miles driven cannot, as a
practical matter, be used by the products liability insurers of
suppliers and manufacturers. Additionally, insureds who are
charged more than their risk warrants are also more likely to
underinsure or drop out of the pool altogether. The recently
approved Pay-as-You-Drive policies are an attempt to address
this issue with respect to the annual miles driven factor.
D. Some Mandatory Rating Factors Do Not Work with AVs
Proposition 103’s mandatory rating factors simply do not
fit the brave new world of AVs. The most important factor,
“driving safety record,” is singularly inapt when the car is
driverless.153 Indeed, one might expect or encourage a driver
with a poor record to opt for a driverless car. Nevertheless,
Proposition 103 requires the insured’s driving safety record to
rank as the top-rating factor. Since driving record was
singled out in the “Declarations” portion of the Proposition,
even a two-thirds vote of the legislature to amend it may not
“further” the Proposition’s purposes.154
The second rating factor, the “number of miles he or she
drives annually,” does appear to directly bear on the risk of
AVs.155 There is a possible statutory interpretation issue with
the reference to “he or she drives.” It may be argued that it is
the car that is driving, not “he or she.” The proposed Nevada
regulations referenced above provide that the “operator” (the
one who engaged the AV) is “deemed the driver.”156
153. See id.; John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google
.html?scp=1&sq=autonomous%20vehicles&st=cse (“The technology is ahead of
the law in many areas.”).
154. Section 1 of Proposition 103 declares, among its purposes, “Second,
automobile insurance rates shall be determined primarily by a driver's safety
record and mileage driven.” Text of Proposition 103, CONSUMER WATCHDOG
(Jan. 1, 2008), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/feature/text-proposition-103.
155. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1184
(Ct. App. 2000).
156. NEV. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, LCB File No. R084-11, PROPOSED
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The third ranking mandatory factor, the “number of
years of driving experience the insured has had,” again seems
almost completely inapposite.157 When the driver is merely a
passenger, the person’s driving experience has little or no
relevance to risk. Indeed, one may imagine youngsters who
could not get a driver’s license, and older people who should
long ago have surrendered their keys, being ferried about in
fully autonomous vehicles.
Proposition 103 also forbids rates that are “unfairly
discriminatory.”158 Perhaps the most commonly accepted
definition of unfairly discriminatory in the context of
insurance is: “An insurance rate structure will be considered
to be unfairly discriminatory . . . if allowing for practical
limitations, there are premium differences that do not
correspond to expected losses and average expenses or if there
are expected average cost differences that are not reflected in
premium differences.”159 Applying this definition, one could
easily argue that pumping and tempering rates is unfairly
discriminatory. If the process is mandated by Proposition
103, the same Proposition that forbids unfairly discriminatory
rates, it would seem that unfair discrimination may be both
legal and mandated in California.
The most sensible approach to this dilemma, at least
with respect to AVs, would be to abolish or substantially reorder the three mandatory rating factors. However, this is
more easily said than done. As noted above, amending
Proposition 103 requires a two-thirds vote of the
legislature.160
Moreover, section 8(b) of the Proposition
provides: “The provisions of this act shall not be amended by

REGULATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, available at
http://www.dmvnv.com/public_meetings/R084-11.pdf.
157. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found., 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1184.
158. See id. at 1224.
159. C. Arthur Williams, Price Discrimination in Property and Liability
Insurance, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 209–42 (1969)
(emphasis added). Principle four of the CAS Actuarial Statement of Principles
for Ratemaking states: “A rate is reasonable and not excessive, inadequate, or
unfairly discriminatory if it is an actuarially sound estimate of the expected
value of all future costs associated with an individual risk transfer.” CAS.
ACTUARIAL SOC., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPALS REGARDING PROPERTY AND
CAUSALTY INSURANCE RULEMAKING 6 (1988), http://www.casact.org/stand
ards/princip/sppcrate.pdf.
160. See Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal.
App. 4th 1354, 1359 n.1 (Ct. App. 2005).
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the Legislature except to further its purposes.”161 Both of
these requirements can be formidable hurdles.
Persistency discounts serve as an example. Most are
aware that their insurer discounts their rates if they have
been with the insurer for a period of time.162 This is called
the “persistency discount.” The discount is usually justified
on the basis that persistency saves the insurer the producing
expenses associated with finding a new insured. If one wants
to change insurers, Proposition 103 does not permit the
subsequent insurer to match the persistency discount offered
by the insured’s current insurer.163 Thus, the second insurer
could not compete by offering the same discount. Changing
insurers, then, was somewhat like a taxable event. The “tax”
is the loss of the persistency discount when purchasing the
new policy.
The California legislature concluded that this both
undermined competition and drove up the cost of insurance
by discouraging the ability to shop for lower rates. The
legislature made the following findings:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it furthers
the purpose of Proposition 103 to encourage competition
among carriers so that coverage overall will be priced
competitively. The Legislature further finds and declares
that competition is furthered when insureds are able to
claim a discount for regular purchases of insurance from
any carrier offering this discount irrespective of whether
or not the insured has previously purchased from a given
carrier offering the discount.164

Despite these legislative findings, the Court of Appeal
held the amendment invalid because, in the Court’s view, it
did not further the purposes of Proposition 103.165 The Court
161. Id. at 1364.
162. See California Court Strikes Down Persistence Discount Law, INS. J.
(Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2005/09/30/
60326.htm.
163. See id. (2003 California law that permitted insureds to switch insurance
companies and maintain their persistency discount was struck down as not
furthering the purposes of Proposition 103).
164. See Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 1362
n.6.
165. Id. at 1362. The court also noted that “[t]wo prior attempts by the
Legislature to amend Proposition 103 have been invalidated by the courts
because they did not ‘further [the] purposes’ of the initiative, as section 8,
subdivision (b) requires.” Id. at 1366 (citing Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 11
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also held that Proposition 103 vests only the Insurance
Commissioner with the power to set optional rating factors.166
Thus, the legislature, even by a super majority, may not be
authorized to adopt rating factors for auto insurance.
Following this defeat in the courts, promoters of “portable
persistency” qualified a ballot initiative to amend this aspect
of Proposition 103. With a vote of 51.9% to 48.1%, the
initiative failed in the June 8, 2010 election.167
Some statutory interpretation might avoid much of this
discrimination. The NAIC, every state, and Proposition 103
all require that rates may not be “unfairly discriminatory.”
Proposition 103 also requires that the three mandatory rating
factors—driving record, annual mileage, and years of driving
experience—be applied “in decreasing order of importance.”
The Proposition expressly forbids unfairly discriminatory
rates, but it does not define “order of importance” or expressly
require or authorize the pumping and tempering of
mandatory and optional rating factors. Another reading more
closely allied with the universal policy forbidding unfairly
discriminatory rates might be to interpret the Proposition to
require only that the mandatory factors be given the
maximum weight that the underlying data supports. No
court has yet adopted this approach, but AVs may be the
reductio ad absurdum that prompts rethinking the issue. To
Cal. 4th 1243, 1265 (1995) (stating purposes of Prop. 103 not furthered by
exempting surety insurance)); Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v.
Quackenbush, 64 Cal. App. 4th 1473, 1494 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating purposes of
Prop. 103 not furthered by reducing insurers’ obligation to refund excess
premiums).
166. Id. at 1372 (“Under Proposition 103, therefore, it is the Insurance
Commissioner rather than the Legislature that is vested with ratemaking
authority subject to the appropriate ratemaking process.”); CAL. INS. CODE §
1861.02(a)(4) (West 2011) (“Rates and premium for an automobile insurance
policy . . . shall be determined by application of the following factors [listing the
3 mandatory factors] [and] [t]hose other factors that the commissioner may
adopt by regulation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
167. Prop
17
Auto
Insurance,
U.C.
BERKELEY,
http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/research/quickhelp/elections/2010primary/prop17.
php (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). Proposition 17 appeared on the June 8, 2010
ballot. A similar proposition has been filed with the California Attorney
General’s office (Initiative 11-0013) and may appear on the November, 2012
ballot. See CHANGES LAW TO ALLOW AUTO INSURANCE COMPANIES TO SET
PRICES BASED ON A DRIVER’S HISTORY OF INSURANCE COVERAGE. INITIATIVE
STATUTE (INITIATIVE 11-0013, AMENDMENT #1-S (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i944_title_and_summary_110013_final.pdf (last visited May 15, 2012).
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count the insured’s driving record and the years of driving
experience as two of the three most important rating factors
when, in fact, they are irrelevant when rating a self-driven
automobile would be, one may modestly suggest, absurd.
Under Proposition 103 as currently interpreted, there
may be one or two other rather poor options.
The
Commissioner can adopt a fourth optional rating factor for
AVs.168 The type of car being insured is presently among the
Even if AVs are
current optional rating factors.169
substantially safer than other vehicles, this rating factor
must still rank behind driving safety record, miles driven
annually, and number of years of driving experience.170
Under such a rating scenario, there would be little motive for
a driver with a poor driving record to opt for the safer AV.
The insured’s rates would still be based on the rates that
would apply were the insured to drive an ordinary vehicle.
Time is a great leveler. As bad drivers operate AVs, their
driving records will improve. There should be no citations
and no principally at fault accidents. In three years’ time one
would expect the driving record to approach perfection—along
with all other AV drivers. This simply illustrates again why
the insured’s driving record is irrelevant as a rating factor.
No driver is any better or any worse than any other driver.
Yet, this irrelevant rating factor must be weighted more than
other far more relevant factors, such as miles driven, the type
of vehicle, and territory. This also illustrates that the rating
factors related to the type and capacity of the vehicle, rating
factors that now dwell in the tempered company of other
optional rating factors, should be allowed to rise to the
position they deserve.
Adding AVs to the pool of insured cars may also increase
the weight of the territorial rating factor. Although current
regulations require that territory must rank last among all
rating factors, as some of those factors fall away, the weight
of the territorial factor may well rise. Rather than ranking

168. INS. § 1861.02(a)(4) (“Those other factors that the commissioner may
adopt by regulation and that have a substantial relationship to the risk of
loss.”).
169. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(1) (2008).
170. Tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(1) (stating the type of vehicle); tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(8)
(stating the vehicle characteristics, including engine size, safety and protective
devices, damageability, reparability, and theft deterrent devices).
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fifteenth and sixteenth among optional rating factors,
territory may rise to fifth or sixth place.
There is a second possible compromise that may help,
and it requires neither legislation nor a new proposition.
Prior to the 2006 amendments to the regulations governing
the rating factors, all of the optional rating factors could be
averaged together.171 If their average weight, when compared
to the third mandatory rating factor—years of driving
experience—was less than the weight of years of driving
experience, then the insurer’s class plan was in compliance
with the Proposition.
This method was challenged.
Recognizing broad discretion in the Commissioner to adopt
rating factors in compliance with Proposition 103, the Court
of Appeal upheld this approach.172 As his last regulatory act
before leaving office, then Commissioner John Garamendi
scrapped this system and introduced the current system in
which each optional factor must weigh less than the third
mandatory factor.
Subsequent Commissioners have not
sought to revisit this issue.
AVs may catalyze some
rethinking along this line.
E. The Good Driver Discount
Assuming that application of the mandatory rating
factors is a problem not so intractable that it cannot be
solved, a California insurer would also face dealing with the
Good Driver Discount (GDD). Proposition 103 mandates that
all insurers offer a GDD “to every person who meets the
criteria.”173 The regulations adopted pursuant to Proposition
103 speak in terms of “driver.”174 Those who qualify are
entitled to a rate “at least 20% below the rate the insured
would otherwise have been charged.”175 Except for some
serious offences, such as drunk driving, the basic outline is
this:

171. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1190
(Ct. App. 2000); Wells, supra note 16.
172. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found., 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1185–86.
173. INS. §§ 1861.02(b)(1), 1861.025.
174. Tit. 10, §§ 2632.13; 2632.13.1.
175. INS. § 1861.02(b)(2); The California Code of Regulations section
2632.12(a) interprets this mandate, changing it to “20 percent less than the
lowest rate available to a comparable driver who is not a good driver.” Tit. 10, §
2632.12(a) (emphasis added).
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 A moving violation, which has not been masked by
going to driving school, receives one point.
 An accident for which the driver is “principally at fault”
that resulted in only damage to property exceeding
$1,000 receives one point.176
 If principally at fault and the accident resulted in
bodily injury, the driver receives two points.177
 If a driver receives two points within a three-year
period, the insurer may withdraw the GDD. The driver
then loses the GDD for at least three years.178

Class plans also include, as they must, a separate rating
factor for driving safety record (the first mandatory rating
factor), and a driving record that counts against the GDD also
counts against the driving safety record rating factor.179
Thus, a driver may lose both the GDD and the discount based
on driving record. Since driving safety record must be the
most important rating factor, the loss of both will often cause
a fifty percent or more rise in premiums.
The Commissioner of Insurance is instructed by the
Proposition to adopt regulations setting guidelines to be used
to determine fault for the purposes of the GDD.180 The
Commissioner has adopted extensive regulatory guidelines.181
Very early in the life of Proposition 103 the
Commissioner adopted a definition of “principally at fault”
that presents some anomalies. Proposition 103 does not
define “principally,” but the Commissioner adopted a
definition which, at least in theory, allows only one driver in a

176. INS. § 1861.025(b)(1)(A).
177. Results under these two provisions can seem quite arbitrary. One who
breaks a headlight on a premium car may well do more than $1000 in damage,
while the same driver who totals an older and less expensive car may do less
than $1000 in damage (the salvage value of the car). In addition, the statute
and regulations offer no definition of “bodily injury.”
See INS. §
1861.025(b)(1)(A); tit. 10, § 2632.12(a). A pregnant woman in a minor accident
may reasonably incur several thousand dollars in medical bills simply to find
that she is quite well. Another person may expend ten dollars on antiinflammatory drugs because the person’s back was uncomfortable for a week. Is
either, or neither, “bodily injury?”
178. Tit. 10, § 2632.13.1.
179. Note that, by regulation, only principally-at-fault accidents may be
counted against the driving safety record rating factor. See tit. 10, § 2632.13.
180. INS. § 1861.025(b)(3).
181. Tit. 10, §§ 2632.12, 2632.13, 2632.13.1.
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multi-vehicle accident to be principally at fault.182 The
regulation provides that: “An insurer shall not make a
determination that a driver is principally at-fault for an
accident unless the driver’s actions or omissions were at least
51 percent of the legal cause of the accident . . . .”183
Put another way, one may remain a good driver for the
purposes of the GDD discount if one is “lucky” enough to have
another driver equally or more at fault. Four drivers, all of
whom run a four-way stop, are all good drivers for this
purpose (each is only twenty-five percent the legal cause of
the accident). Two drivers going thirty miles per hour over
the limit are both good drivers if they contribute equally to
the damages. Drivers insured by different insurers, however,
could both be found to be principally at fault because the
insurers need not coordinate their findings. By contrast, only
one could be found principally at fault if both happen to be
insured by the same company.
The regulations also provide a number of rebuttable
presumptions that, in certain accident scenarios, the driver is
not principally at fault. For example, the driver is rebuttably
presumed not to be principally at fault if “the vehicle was
struck in the rear by another vehicle, and the driver has not
been convicted of a moving traffic violation in connection with
the accident,”184 or “the driver was not convicted of a moving
traffic violation and the operator of another vehicle involved
in the accident was convicted of a moving traffic violation.”185
Applying the GDD to AVs will present some difficulties
and some anomalies. The current definition of principally at
fault speaks only in terms of causation.186 Perhaps fault is
implied, but the regulation, at least for accidents in
California, does not explicitly require fault, nor, if fault is
implied, does the regulation suggest how culpability is to be
weighed along with causation.
If the regulation requires fault on the part of the driver,
then it is difficult to see how it is to be applied to cars that are
not driven by a driver. Even if the principally at fault
182. See tit. 10, § 2632.13.1.
183. Tit. 10, §§ 2632.13(b), 2632.13.1.
184. Tit. 10, § 2632.139(c)(2) (emphasis added).
185. Tit. 10, § 2632.13(c)(3) (emphasis added).
186. Tit. 10, § 2632.13(b) (emphasis added) (“At least 51 percent of the legal
cause of the accident.”).
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determination is to be based only on causation, it is difficult
to see how “the driver’s actions or omissions” satisfied the “at
Moreover, some of the
least 51 percent” standard.187
rebuttable presumptions arise only if the “driver” or “the
operator of another vehicle” has not been convicted of a
moving traffic violation related to the accident.188 If the car
has no driver or operator, however substantial the
contribution to the accident, the AV or its owner will not be
principally at fault. Also, if one is to consider fault, then in a
collision with an AV any ordinary driver who shares any level
of fault may be principally at fault because the ordinary
driver is the only driver who shares any fault. Thus, the
GDD must be extended to the AV regardless of the
automobile’s actual risk. Put another way, all operators of
AVs would be entitled to an insurance rate twenty percent
less than the insurer would otherwise charge.
Since insurance is a zero-sum-game, and an insurer
would not stay in business long if it charged all of its
policyholders twenty percent less than it should charge, the
difference must be made up elsewhere. At present, it is made
up from those who do not qualify as good drivers. If all
vehicles were autonomous, and all AV “drivers” were good
drivers, then the system would crash. There would simply be
no one to make up the twenty percent in lost premium. As
the number of AVs increases and the pool of “not good”
drivers shrinks, the financial burden on not good drivers
could be ruinous. Imagine the premium for the driver who
has two points in the previous three years and owns the last
ordinary car in California. The premium would be tens of
millions of dollars. Moreover, the insurer does not have the
option to make up the difference from other rating groups,
such as vehicle type, gender, or territory, because to do so
would likely raise the weight of those groups above the
mandatory rating factors.
In order to keep insurance viable and to avoid some of the
enormous spikes in premiums for “not good drivers,”189
insurers and the Department adopted regulatory language

187. Id.
188. Tit. 10, § 2632.13(c)(3).
189. This awkward phrase is apt because it is the language of the regulation
and because those who are “not good” drivers are not necessarily “bad” drivers.
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which may be at odds with the Proposition’s language.
California’s regulatory language bases the GDD rate on the
rate for “a comparable driver who is not a good driver”190
rather than the rate “the insured would otherwise have been
charged.”
This gloss on the statute causes dramatic changes. Its
virtue is that the changes are less dramatic than applying the
Proposition’s language. Some simple illustrations follow. 191
Example #1
Assume a group of 100 good drivers and 10 not good
drivers. Assume in all other respects they are equal.192
Assume, also, that the premium to cover the good drivers
would be $100 each, and assume the premium to cover the
not good drivers would be $110 each. This pool of insureds
would generate the need for a total premium of (100 x $100) +
(10 x $110) = $11,100. Applying the Proposition’s language,
the good drivers should be offered a rate of $80 rather than
$100. This would generate $8000 in total premium. Since
the pool must generate $11,100 in premium, the difference
($3100) must be made up by the not good drivers. Since there
are only ten of them, each not good driver’s premium would
go from $110 to $310 (i.e., the $3,100 shortfall divided by the
ten remaining drivers who must share it.)
Example #2
The phrase “would otherwise have been charged” is not
self-defining, so one may approach the calculation differently.
Apply the same assumptions about the pool and premium as
above. If we do not know anything about individual drivers,
then the premium each driver would otherwise be charged is
$11,100 divided by 110, or $100.90 each. One could argue
190. Compare CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(b) (West 2011) (“[A]t least 20% below
the rate the insured would otherwise have been charged”) with tit. 10, §
2632.12(a) (“20 percent less than the lowest rate available to a comparable
driver who is not a good driver.”) (emphasis added).
191. For similar examples of computing rates in the context of the
persistency rating factor, see Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v.
Garamendi, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1367 (Ct. App. 2005).
192. Of course, all things would not be equal. Some self-driving cars may be
safer than others. Some will be more expensive to repair than others. Some
will be garaged in neighborhoods less safe than others. None of these factors,
however, alters the point of the hypothetical.
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that $100.90 is what the policyholder “would otherwise have
been charged.” Discounting this by 20% yields a good driver
rate of $80.72 per policy. This will bring in a total premium
from the 100 good drivers of $8072. The balance ($11,100 –
$8072 = $3028) must be collected from the remaining ten not
good drivers. This puts the not good driver’s premium at
$302.80 each (divide $3028 by 10 for the ten not good drivers).
The total collected equals the $11,100 necessary to support
this book of business.
Example #3
One can see in this last example that under the
Proposition’s language the greater the number of not good
drivers in the relevant pool, the higher the rates for the good
drivers and the lower the rates for the not good drivers.
Assume, for example, that the pool consisted of 100 not good
drivers and only 10 good drivers. The insurer must collect a
total of $12,000 to cover this book of business. Doing the
same calculations as in Example #2 the good drivers would
pay $87.27 per policy and the not good drivers would pay
$111.29 (try your hand at the arithmetic). This is a small
increase for the 10 good drivers (an increase from $80.72 to
$87.27), but a large benefit for the 100 not good drivers (a
decrease from $302.80 to $111.29).
Example #4
Applying the regulation, the insurer must offer the good
drivers a premium that is “at least 20 percent less than the
lowest rate available to a comparable driver who is not a good
driver.” To accomplish this, the insurer must first solve for
the not good driver rate, and then offer the good drivers .80 of
that rate. Assume the same numbers as in Example #1.
Again, the total premium must equal $11,100. Where x is the
not good driver rate, the formula is: 10x + 100(.80x) =
$11,100. X (the not good driver rate) is $123.33. The good
driver rate must, then, be equal to or less than .80 x $123.33
= $98.66. This is a very large difference between what the
Proposition suggests and what the regulation effects. The
good driver’s rate rises from $80 to $98.66 (only $3.34 below
what they, arguably, “would otherwise have been charged”),
while the not good driver’s rate falls from over $300 to the
more palatable $123.33. Indeed, since the GDD is a twenty
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percent discount from the rate for not good drivers, the GDD
becomes illusory if the rate for a not good driver exceeds the
base rate by twenty percent or more.
Example #5
If the proportion of not good drivers in the relevant pool
increases, the rates for both good drivers and not good drivers
begin to fall. Reverse the relative number of good and not
good drivers to 10 good drivers and 100 not good drivers. The
rate for not good drivers falls to $111.11 and the rate for good
drivers drops to $88.88. Again, try your hand at the
arithmetic. 193
The results in Examples #4 and #5 show that the method
of calculating the good driver discount is unfairly
discriminatory. The rates bear little relationship to “the
expected value of all future costs associated with an
individual risk transfer.”194 Even if one could articulate a
principled basis for reducing good drivers’ rates to twenty
percent less than they otherwise would be charged, there is
no principled basis for allowing the rates for good and not
good drivers, which we know should be $100 and $110
respectively, substantially to vary merely because of the mix
of good and not good drivers in the insurance company’s pool.
The proportion of good and not good drivers is a matter
entirely beyond the insured’s control and has no bearing on
the insured’s individual risk.
However one calculates the GDD, inserting into the pool
large numbers of AVs entitled to the twenty percent discount
will
have
important,
and
possibly
unanticipated,
consequences. Since AVs should generate fewer liabilities for
automobile insurers (both because they are safer and because
possibly a significant number of the remaining losses may
leapfrog over the automobile insurer directly to the supplier
or manufacturer), adding them to the pool will lower overall
automobile rates.

193. 100x + 10(.80x) = $12,000. X, the not good driver’s rate, equals $111.11.
Eighty percent of the not good driver’s rate equals $88.88.
194. CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC., supra note 160.
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Example #6
Assume the same 110 car pool from above, but change
the mix to:
Good drivers –95
Good drivers in AVs-5
Not Good drivers-9
Not Good drivers in
AVs-1

Per unit cost—100
Per unit cost—50
Per unit cost—110
Per unit cost—50

Total cost
Total cost
Total cost
Total cost

9,500
250
990
50

Total premium needed to service this group—$10,790
Since this is less than the $11,100 in Example #1, it
stands to reason that individual premiums will be lower. The
average cost, or base rate, is $98.09 ($10,790/110). Now
calculate the GDD using the same formula as above: 10x +
100(.80x) = $10,790. The not good driver premium is $119.80
and the good driver premium (.80 x $119.89) is $95.91. Both
are lower than the premium calculated above using the
regulation.
The five good drivers driving AVs and the one not good
driver driving an AV, however, are paying far too much.
Based on their risk, each should pay $50. The not good AV
driver’s premium is $119.89 and the good AV driver’s
premium is $95.91.
To make this fairer, one must create a rating class for AV
drivers. If they could be hived off from the other drivers, this
would be easy. Each would pay $50. Since these are
“automobile liability” policies within the meaning of
California Insurance Code section 660(a), and since section
660(a) is incorporated by Proposition 103,195 they must be
rated with all other policies. Consequently, the GDD must be
extended to them, and the mandatory rating factors must also
be applied to them. As a consequence, AV drivers in general
will pay too much, and AV drivers with poor driving records
will pay much too much.

195. INS. § 1861.02(a) (“Rates and premiums for an automobile insurance
policy, as described in subdivision (a) of Section 660, shall be determined by
application of the following factors in decreasing order of importance . . . .”).
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F. Putting It All Together
To calculate the premium for the AVs, the insurer must
first calculate the GDD. Again, assuming the group above
and applying the regulations, the result is $95.91 for the
“good” AV driver and $119.89 for the “not good” AV driver.
The next step might be to create a rating plan for the
class of AV drivers. This, however, is not permitted by
Proposition 103. The insurer must first apply, in descending
order of importance, the three mandatory rating factors
imposed by Proposition 103. Let us focus only on the first
one—Driving Safety Record. Since the AV is self-driven, the
driving safety record should be irrelevant, as illustrated by
the assumed $50 unit cost for both good and not good drivers
of AVs in our hypothetical. Nevertheless, driving safety
record must be the most important of all the rating factors.
The calculations are shown in Appendix A.196 In order to
comply with Proposition 103 and the accompanying
regulations, the “weight” attributed to driving safety record
must be greater than the “weight” attributed to the fact that
the car is an AV. The weight attributed to driving safety
record (remember, there are some bad drivers in ordinary
cars among the group) is 3.96. The weight attributable to
AVs is 5.35. This rate plan would be out of compliance;
therefore, the insurer must either “pump” the driving safety
record-rating factor by artificially expanding its relativities or
“temper” the AV rating factor by artificially compressing its
relativities, or both. When one rating factor is pumped, then
another must be tempered in order that the total premium
collected equals the $10,790 original total premium covering
all losses and related costs.
Appendix A shows the calculations assuming tempering
(col. 9) or pumping (col. 10). The tempered weight for AVs in
col. (18) is a fraction below (at the 14th decimal place!) the

196. The author is extremely grateful to Shawna Ackerman for her
invaluable assistance in developing this example. Ms. Ackerman is an actuary
who has worked for the California Department of Insurance, for Pinnacle
Actuarial Resources, Inc., and now works for the California Earthquake
Authority.
An electronic copy of this paper can be found at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/337/.
The formulae for the
calculations are imbedded in the Excel spread sheet noted in the Appendix to
this Article and can be manipulated by the user after the Appendix is
downloaded.
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3.96 weight for driving record in col. (8), so it is now in
compliance. In neither case does the AV insured pay the
appropriate amount. In one case the good AV driver pays
$60.44 and the not good AV driver pays $75.55—both well
over the $50 represented by their risk. The excess premium
returns to the pool and subsidizes non-AV drivers. In the
pumping example, the five good AV drivers pay $47.63 (only a
discount of $2.37 below the $50 risk) and the one not good AV
driver pays $63.17 ($13.17 too much). A small subsidy of
$1.32 [$13.17 – 5($2.37)] flows back to the premium pool to
subsidize other drivers. Note, too, that the good AV driver’s
premium is, as it must be, equal to or less than eighty percent
of the not good AV driver’s premium, even though both
present the same unit cost ($50 per car) and in one example,
the good AV driver, even with the GDD, pays $10.44 more
than the $50 unit cost of the risk.
Keep in mind that this calculation relates only to the
driving record rating factor. At its highest permissible
weight, the rating of AVs must weigh less than the third
rating factor (years of driving experience—likely of little
relevance for self-driving cars), thus pushing it even further
from its true weight. Therefore, the best position AVs can
enjoy in this ratings race is fourth place.
One may argue that raising the premium for a not good
driver of a self-driving car makes as much sense as raising
the price of bus or train tickets for not good drivers.
Awarding a GDD that results in a premium of $10.44 more
than the risk makes little sense. It is difficult to imagine any
social policy supporting this discrimination.
Perhaps there is a way out of this dilemma. One might
argue that an owner of an AV is not a “person who qualifies”
under the Proposition because the GDD is a discount earned
by good driving. Perhaps it is arguable that a person who
does not drive is not a “driver,” therefore cannot be a “good
driver.” This interpretation, though sensible, would require
some stretching of the Proposition’s language and would
probably invite a court challenge.
Commercial insurers of manufacturers and suppliers are
not encumbered with Proposition 103’s unique automobile
provisions,197 therefore they need not offer a GDD, nor need
197. The automobile provisions of Proposition 103 only apply to automobile
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they conform to the ranking of the mandatory rating factors.
To the extent that the risks of AVs are transferred to them,
the insurance burden passed to consumers in the price of the
car can reflect the actual, and presumably lower, risk
presented by AVs. As noted above, however, for practical
reasons some rating factors, such as annual miles driven and
territory, cannot properly be reflected in the automobile price.
Moving from the awkward and arbitrary results mandated by
Proposition 103’s rating factors to a commercial insurance
setting that cannot properly reflect some other rating factors
is also an awkward trade-off. At best, it may be a choice of
the least worst.198
Another viable solution might to be to amend the
California Insurance Code section 660(a) to exclude from the
definition of “policy” those policies covering liability for AVs
(at least when operated in autonomous mode).
Since
Proposition 103 incorporates section 660(a), this would likely
require a two-thirds vote of the legislature and the
amendment would have to “further the purposes” of
Proposition 103.
Assuming a two-thirds vote could be
mustered, the issue would then be whether the amendment
furthers the purposes of the Proposition. To the extent that
liability moves from fault-based driving to defect-based
products liability, the purposes underlying the mandatory
rating factors and the GDD simply cannot be accomplished.
Manufacturers will pass these costs through to automobile
buyers free of the Proposition’s restraints. Since the purposes
of the Proposition, at least with respect to liability
coverage,199 simply cannot be accomplished when dealing with
self-driving cars, amending section 660(a) would not frustrate
the purposes of Proposition 103.
“Furthering” may be
different from “not frustrating,” but avoiding forcing

liability, physical damage or collisions policies. INS. § 1861.02(a); CAL. INS.
CODE § 660(a) (West 2011). Since the automobile provisions of Proposition 103
do not apply to commercial policies, manufacturers need not pump, temper or
offer a good driver discount.
198. As King Lear lamented when forced to choose, so he thought, between
evil daughter Goneril and very evil daughter Regan, “Not being the worst
stands in some rank of praise.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR art II, sc. iv
(W. Cross and T. Brooke, ed., Yale Univ. 1993).
199. There still may be some role for comprehensive, collision and MedPay
coverage, at least to the extent that these offer coverages unattached to any
fault on the part of the insured or defect on the part of the insured automobile.
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Proposition 103 into a mold that does not fit its purposes
could be viewed as furthering its purposes. It is also unlikely
that the voters considered insurance rules governing
automobiles that, at the time they adopted Proposition 103,
existed only in fantasy. If the Department of Insurance were
to sponsor the legislation, one might expect the sponsorship
to be afforded some level of deference.200
Jurisdictions not governed by Proposition 103 would find
it relatively easy to deal with this advancing technology.
Proposition 103, and the difficulties faced with amending it,
may leave California at a decided disadvantage when it comes
to coping with this developing technology.
IV. ADJUSTING RATES TO REFLECT RAPIDLY IMPROVING
TECHNOLOGY
Technology improves at an astounding rate. Gordon
Moore, a past president of Intel, famously (and thus far
accurately) predicted that transistor count on microprocessors
would grow exponentially—doubling every two years.201 This
has become known as “Moore’s Law.” His colleague at Intel,
David House, predicted that this would cause computer
performance to double every eighteen months.202 Perhaps
this should be known as “House’s Corollary.” Whether or not
these predictions directly bear on AVs, one can expect rapid
developments in the technology controlling them. Thus, the
risks they present may dramatically change with the latest
download, update or patch. So, too, the appropriate rate for
the risk should change—likely downward. Proposition 103
makes it difficult to produce timely rates that are reasonably
responsive to changes in loss exposures.
200. See Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal.
App. 4th 1354, 1373 (Ct. App. 2005) (“Great weight should be given to an
agency's construction of a rule or regulation it enforces.”).
201. Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,
38 PROC. OF THE IEEE 1, available at ftp://download.intel.com/
museum/Moores_Law/Articles-Press_Releases/Gordon_Moore_1965_Article.pdf.
The increase in the number of transistors on a microprocessor looks roughly like
this: 1971—2300, 1985—275,000, 2000—42 million, 2004—592 million, 2011—
3 billion. Steven Johnson, More & More of Moore’s Law, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 5, 2011, at C1.
202. INTEL, VIDEO TRANSCRIPT: EXCERPT FROM A CONVERSATION WITH
GORDON
MOORE:
MOORE’S
LAW
(2005),
ftp://download.intel.com/
museum/Moores_Law/Video-Transcripts/Excepts_A_Conversation_with_Gordon
_Moore.pdf.
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Automobile manufacturers and sellers may adjust their
prices according to the market. Proposition 103, however,
provides, in effect, that those who sell automobile insurance
must charge the full sticker price.203 Proposition 103 also
provides that “[e]very insurer which desires to change any
rate shall file a complete rate application with the
commissioner.”204 While this may, on its face, seem a neutral
provision, its practical impact is contrary to the interests of
consumers. Like other businesses, insurance is somewhat
cyclical. There are “hard markets” in which supply is
restricted and one might expect rates to rise. There are “soft
markets” where insurance is more available or demand is
lower, thus one might expect rates to fall. This provision, as
currently interpreted, applies even when an insurer wants to
lower rates. Lower rates, of course, benefit consumers.
While voters who adopted Proposition 103 may well have
had in mind keeping rates at the lowest rate at which an
insurer will be willing to bring a product to the market, it
seems unlikely that the voters intended to increase
impediments to lowering rates—at least not when lowering
rates would not threaten the solvency of the insurer.
Filing a “complete rate application with the
commissioner” is a substantial impediment to reducing rates.
A complete rate application is an expensive, ponderous and
time-consuming process. A typical filing may take three to
five months before approval. Some applications have even
been delayed for a year.205 In 2009, when insurers filed many
new rate plans in order to comply with the new territorial
rating regulations, delays among the top twenty private
passenger auto insurers ranged from a low of 54 days (Viking)
to a high of 558 days (USAA and USAA Casualty). Many
took over 300 days (e.g., State Farm Mutual, Farmers
Insurance Exchange, Progressive Choice).206 If the desire to
lower rates is in response to a “soft market,” by the time the
lower rate has been approved, the market may have
significantly altered. Thus, it removes, to the detriment of
203. See MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1440–41 (Ct.
App. 2010).
204. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(b) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
205. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE (July 28, 2009),
http://insurance.ca.gov/.
206. Id.
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consumers, one motive to lower rates in a soft market. In
addition, once an application to lower rates is filed, the
Commissioner, consumer groups, and others can intervene
and ask that the rates be lowered even further.207 Thus, an
application to lower a rate by six percent may invite pressure
to lower it even further.208 If they “substantially contributed,
as a whole” to the decision, a consumer group can also bill the
insurance company for its legal, advocacy, and witness fees.209
Unless otherwise required by the Commissioner of
Insurance, an insurer may normally expect a rate, once
approved, to remain valid for three years.210 Given the
disincentives to lowering rates outlined above, one may
expect that an insurer who wants to lower its rates to
compete for greater market share in a softening market may
temporize until otherwise required to make a new rate
application.211 This is especially so because, even if the
insurer successfully completes a rate application to lower its
rates, if market conditions harden during this three year
period, there is no assurance, without going through the
entire process again, that the insurer can return its rates to
the previously approved rates.

207. INS. § 1861.05(c).
208. For example, GEICO General filed to lower rates by 9.70%. On July 5,
2007, the Department approved a rate reduction of 14.50%, - 4.80% lower than
requested. This is not to suggest that the lower rate is not justified, but just to
illustrate that applications to lower rates come with some risk to the insurer.
There are numerous other examples on the Department’s web site. State Farm
Mutual filed to lower its rates by 3.20%, but the approved rate on April 5, 2009
was -8.00%—a difference of -4.80%. Infinity Insurance filed to lower rates by
2.79%, but the approved rate on 7/22/09 was -10.44%—a difference of -7.65%.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, supra note 205.
209. INS. § 1861.10(b).
The commissioner or a court shall award reasonable advocacy and
witness fees and expenses to any person who demonstrates that (1) the
person represents the interests of consumers, and, (2) that he or she
has made a substantial contribution to the adoption of any order,
regulation or decision by the commissioner or a court. Where such
advocacy occurs in response to a rate application, the award shall be
paid by the applicant.
Id.; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2661.1(k) (2008).
210. Tit. 10, § 2644.50. Many insurers, however, file rate plans more
frequently. Yearly filings are not uncommon.
211. Indeed, it may be that some of the longer rate processing times noted
above may have been in part a result of temporizing by insurers who, during the
process, were applying what they thought were favorable rates.
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Experience elsewhere suggests that this disincentive to
lowering rates, with respect to personal automobile
insurance, is unnecessary. Relying primarily on competition
to regulate automobile rates, there are numerous file-and-use
or use-and-file states. These all allow insurer’s to lower rates
(or raise them for that matter) without prior approval—
usually subject to the regulator’s ability to disapprove a rate
based
on
inadequacy,
excessiveness,
or
unfair
discrimination.212 Even among the states that generally
apply “prior approval” to private auto, many permit insurers
to lower rates below the approved rate.213 This is usually
accomplished by moving the process from prior approval to
either file-and-use or use-and-file if the change (often up or
down) falls within a prescribed percentage. The percentage
ranges from a high of 25% (Kentucky) to 10% (Alabama,
Pennsylvania), 7% (South Carolina and possibly New Jersey),
5% (New York) and “less than 5%” (North Dakota).214
There does not appear to be any indication that
facilitating the lowering of rates has impaired the solvency of
insurers.215 The benefits of lower rates to consumers are
obvious. States that show a concern for solvency modulate
the impact by designating a range between five and ten
percent.216 Others simply rely on the regulator’s ability to
disapprove a filed or used rate. California consumers would

212. For examples see Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia (rate decreases for auto),
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky (if rate change is not over twenty-five percent in last
twelve months), Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, Mississippi, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey (only if decrease is revenue neutral),
New Mexico, New York (for rate decreases only), North Dakota (if less than five
percent), Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania (decreases of ten percent or
less), Rhode Island (unless decrease exceeds five percent), South Carolina (up to
seven percent below company’s existing rate), South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Regulation Modernization, supra note 34.
213. See id.
214. For examples, see Alabama (ten percent or less), Georgia (rate decreases
for all lines except large commercial risks), Kentucky (decreases of more than
twenty-five percent within twelve months), New Jersey (increases of seven
percent, unclear about decreases), New York (as of 2010, flex rating up or down
within five percent band in any twelve month period), North Dakota (if less
than five percent), Pennsylvania (decreases of ten percent or less), and South
Carolina (decrease of up to seven percent). The essential elements of various
state regulations are listed online. See id.
215. See id.
216. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05 (West 2011).
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benefit from a similar approach.
While insurers must charge the rate approved by the
Commissioner, that a “rate” has been approved should be no
impediment to charging a lower rate. It seems reasonable
that a rate of $100 includes the lower rate of $95.217 Thus,
insurers should be allowed to flex down without doing
violence to the words or purpose of Proposition 103. New
York, a prior approval state, is probably the most recent state
to move in this direction. Effective January 2010, auto
insurers may flex up or down within a five percent band in
any twelve-month period without seeking prior approval.218
Ability to lower rates will be even more important as the
safety of AVs evolves. Predicting loss trends for one, two or
three years into the future is difficult at best. Marketing
insurance is much like trading in futures. Money is collected
now against a promise to deliver a service later at an
unknown cost. The analogy may be even more apt than
appears.
Following the oil crisis of 1979–1980 claims
frequency dropped. Drivers were not driving more safely;
they were simply driving less because fuel prices had
spiked.219 Where rapidly advancing technology pushes down
the risk presented by AVs, the regulatory environment should
be nimble enough to allow consumers to benefit with equal
promptness.
As in other states, solvency concerns can be addressed by
bounding the flex range within reasonable limits. Proposition
103 provides that the commissioner must hold a hearing if
requested to do so and a rate adjustment for auto insurance
exceeds seven percent.220 This number seems a fair average
for those many states that allow flex down (and usually up)
without prior approval. If claims experience for AVs were to
drop dramatically within the time frame in which an insurer
might reasonably be expected to file a new rate plan, seven
percent may prove too conservative a parameter.
217. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3536 (2011) (“The greater contains the less.”).
218. See Regulation Modernization, supra note 34.
219. LeRoy Boison, Will Post-Katrina Gas Shortages Impact Auto Claim
Frequencies? PINNACLE ACTUARIES, Dec. 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.pinnacleactuaries.com/Files/Publications/mon-PinnacleMonograph
2005GasShortages.pdf.
220. INS. § 1861.05(c) (“[T]he proposed rate adjustment exceeds 7% of the
then applicable rate for personal lines or 15% for commercial lines, in which
case the commissioner must hold a hearing upon a timely request.”).
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There may be some concern that an insurer might flex
down in an unfairly discriminatory way. This concern, if
valid, may be addressed by requiring the insurer to flex down
equally across all classes within the class plan.
If
improvements among the pool of AVs lower claims
experience, lowering rates across the board is an awkward
compromise. Unless rates may be lowered only for AVs, all
insureds, whether driving AVs or more dangerous
automobiles, will benefit from the lower rates attributed to
improvements brought to the pool only by AVs. It should also
be kept in mind that the Commissioner has the power to halt
any rate change by holding a hearing on the Commissioner’s
own motion.221 Virtually every state forbids rates that are
unfairly discriminatory, but this has not been an impediment
to states with the flexibility noted above.
In order to credit savings to the AV owners who have
earned them, it might be helpful to think of an AV that has
been upgraded with a download as a vehicle different from
the one that was originally rated. If a policyholder changes
automobiles mid-term, or changes the use of an automobile
(e.g., a change from commuting to pleasure), the insurer
immediately adjusts the policyholder’s rates.
The
adjustment, however, will be to a rate already pre-approved
in the insurer’s class plan. If, however, an insured purchases
a new model that did not exist at the time of the previous rate
filing, the insurer need not submit a new rate filing to rate
the car. The new model is simply accounted for in the next
rate filing. It may be helpful, then, to think of each
significant upgrade to self-driving cars as analogous to a new
model.
Anticipating rapid advances based on experience and
technology, it might also be possible to pre-approve rate
adjustments based on verifiable improvements. To insure the
integrity of the suggested rate changes, perhaps some
independent certification of the efficacy of the change might
be required.
The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), Department of Transportation
(DOT), or some other body may be an appropriate certifier.
Even if cost savings are clearly attributable to
improvements in AVs, crediting them to AV policyholders
221. Id.
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may be difficult for another reason. Again, the mandatory
rating factors impose their restraints. If rates fall for the
“type of vehicle” rating factor, the factor’s weight may, then,
exceed the weight of the third mandatory factor—years of
driving experience. The insurer would, then, be out of
compliance.
As noted above, to the extent the liability and insurance
burden passes to manufacturers and their insurers, rates
may be adjusted outside the restraints of Proposition 103.
Because the liability and/or insurance costs were passed on to
the buyer in the cost of the car, it would be difficult to pass
savings onto current owners after the sale was completed.
Only new buyers would benefit from insurance savings
attributable to more recent technological improvements.
It may be that the Commissioner could adopt a definition
of “rate” that is broad enough or flexible enough to
accommodate this new technology.
Alternatively, the
Commissioner could sponsor legislation to authorize “flex
down.” If the legislation were viewed as a modification of
Proposition 103, it would require the two-thirds super
majority noted above. It is at least arguable that lowering
rates in a non-discriminatory way and consistent with
maintaining solvency furthers the purposes of the
Proposition.
CONCLUSION
California is the cradle of technological innovation. Not
surprisingly, Google, one of the primary developers of AVs, is
located in California.
California is not the cradle of insurance innovation.
Despite Woody Allen’s 1973 film, Sleeper, the drafters of
Proposition 103, and the voters convinced to follow their lead,
embedded in California a regulatory system ill-suited to
insuring self-driving automobiles that are controlled by new
and fast developing technology.222
Unless ways can be found to conform Proposition 103 to
this new reality, insurance for AVs is likely to migrate to a
statutory and regulatory environment untrammeled by
Proposition
103—commercial
policies
carried
by
manufacturers and suppliers. This migration presents its
222. See SLEEPER, supra note 6.
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own set of problems. While the safety of AVs could be more
fairly rated, other important rating factors, such as annual
miles driven and territory, must be compromised. Whether
this migration occurs will also depend on how liability rules
do or do not adjust to a world in which people will
nevertheless suffer injuries from AVs, but in which it is
unlikely our present fault rules will adequately address
compensation.
If concepts of non-delegable duty, agency, or strict
liability attach initial liability to owners of faulty cars with
faultless drivers, the insurance burden will first be filtered
through automobile insurance governed by Proposition 103.
These insurers will then pass the losses up the distribution
line to the insurers of suppliers and manufacturers that are
not governed by Proposition 103.
Manufacturers and
suppliers will then pass the insurance cost back to AV owners
in the cost of the vehicle. The insurance load reflected in the
price of the car will pass through to automobile owners free of
any of the restrictions imposed by Proposition 103. There will
be no GDD, such as it is, no mandatory rating factors, and,
depending on where the suppliers’ or manufacturers’ insurers
are located, more flexible rating. One may ask: What is
gained by this merry-go-round?
When addressing the insurance challenges of AVs,
perhaps the regulatory system needs someone with the vision
of the late Steve Jobs. In the age of the MacBook Pro,
developers of AVs may find themselves working in a legal and
regulatory environment (the Operating System, if you will)
somewhat akin to the 1985 Mac.
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APPENDIX A
Example with Self-Driving Cars (SDC)223

223. See http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/337/ to access the excel
spreadsheet.
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